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1 Introduction
A popular method to estimate the effect of a treatment on an outcome is to compare over time
groups experiencing different evolutions of their exposure to treatment. In practice, this idea is
implemented by estimating regressions that control for group and time fixed effects. Hereafter,
we refer to those as two-way fixed effects (FE) regressions. We conducted a survey, and found
that 20% of all empirical articles published by the American Economic Review (AER) between
2010 and 2012 have used a two-way FE regression to estimate the effect of a treatment on an
outcome. When the treatment effect is constant across groups and over time, such regressions
estimate that effect under the standard “common trends” assumption. However, it is often
implausible that the treatment effect is constant. For instance, the minimum wage’s effect on
employment may vary across US counties, and may change over time. This paper examines the
properties of two-way FE regressions when the constant effect assumption is violated.
We start by assuming that all observations in the same (g, t) cell have the same treatment and
that the treatment is binary, as is for instance the case when the treatment is a county-level law.
We consider the regression of Yi,g,t, the outcome of unit i in group g at period t on group fixed
effects, period fixed effects, and Dg,t, the treatment in group g at period t. Let β̂fe denote the
coefficient of Dg,t, and let βfe denote its expectation. Under the common trends assumption, we
show that βfe is equal to a weighted sum of the treatment effect in each treated (g, t) cell:
βfe = E
 ∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Wg,t∆g,t
 . (1)
∆g,t is the average treatment effect (ATE) in group g and period t and the weights Wg,ts sum
to one but may be negative. Negative weights arise because β̂fe is a weighted sum of several
difference-in-differences (DID), which compare the evolution of the outcome between consecutive
time periods across pairs of groups. However, the “control group” in some of those comparisons
may be treated at both periods. Then, its treatment effect at the second period gets differenced
out by the DID, hence the negative weights.
The negative weights are an issue when the ATEs are heterogeneous across groups or periods.
Then, one could have that βfe is negative while all the ATEs are positive. For instance, 1.5 ×
1 − 0.5 × 4, a weighted sum of 1 and 4, is strictly negative. Using the data set of Gentzkow
et al. (2011), we find that 40% of the weights attached to βfe are negative, so βfe is not robust
to heterogeneous effects.1
Researchers may want to know how serious that issue is in the application they consider. We
show that conditional on all treatments, the absolute value of the expectation of β̂fe divided by
1 Gentzkow et al. (2011) do not estimate βfe, but βfd, the treatment coefficient in the first-difference regression
defined below. 46% of the weights attached to βfd are strictly negative.
2
the standard deviation of the weights is equal to the minimal value of the standard deviation
of the ATEs across the treated (g, t) cells under which the average treatment on the treated
(ATT) may actually have the opposite sign than that coefficient. One can estimate that ratio
to assess the robustness of the two-way FE coefficient. If that ratio is close to 0, that coefficient
and the ATT can be of opposite signs even under a small and plausible amount of treatment
effect heterogeneity. In that case, treatment effect heterogeneity would be a serious concern for
the validity of that coefficient. On the contrary, if that ratio is very large, that coefficient and
the ATT can only be of opposite signs under a very large and implausible amount of treatment
effect heterogeneity.
Finally, we propose a new estimator, DIDM, that is valid even if the treatment effect is hetero-
geneous over time or across groups. It estimates the average treatment effect across all the (g, t)
cells whose treatment changes from t− 1 to t. It relies on common trends assumptions on both
potential outcomes. Those conditions are partly testable, and we propose a test that amounts
to looking at pre-trends. This test differs from the standard event study pre-trends test (see
Autor, 2003), which has been shown to be invalid when treatment effects are heterogeneous (see
Abraham and Sun, 2018). We show that our estimator is asymptotically normal. We compute
it in the data sets of Gentzkow et al. (2011) and Vella and Verbeek (1998), and in both cases
we find that it is significantly different from β̂fe.2 Our estimator can be used in applications
where, for each pair of consecutive dates, there are groups whose treatment does not change.
We estimate that this condition is satisfied for around 80% of the papers using two-way fixed
effects regressions found in our survey of the AER.
Overall, our paper has implications for applied researchers estimating two-way fixed effects
regressions. First, we recommend that they compute the weights attached to their regression
and the ratio of |β̂fe| divided by the standard deviation of the weights. To do so, they can use the
twowayfeweights Stata package that is available from the SSC repository. If many weights are
negative, and if the ratio is not very large, we recommend that they compute our new estimator,
using the fuzzydid and did_multiplegt Stata packages, also available from the SSC repository
(see de Chaisemartin et al., 2019, for explanations on how to use the former package).
We extend our results in several important directions. First, another commonly-used regression
is the first-difference regression of Yg,t − Yg,t−1, the change in the mean outcome in group g, on
period fixed effects and on Dg,t − Dg,t−1, the change in the treatment. We let βfd denote the
expectation of the coefficient of Dg,t − Dg,t−1. We show that under common trends, βfd also
identifies a weighted sum of treatment effects, with potentially some negative weights. Second,
in our Web Appendix we show that our results extend to fuzzy designs, where the treatment
varies within (g, t) cells, and to two-way fixed effects regressions with a non-binary treatment
and with covariates.
2In both cases, our estimator is also significantly different from β̂fd.
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Our paper is related to the DID literature. Our main result generalizes Theorem 1 in de Chaise-
martin and D’Haultfœuille (2018). When the data has two groups and two periods, the Wald-
DID estimand considered therein is equal to βfe and βfd. Our results on βfe and βfd are
thus extensions of that theorem to the case with multiple periods and groups.3 Moreover, our
DIDM estimator is related to the Wald-TC estimator with many groups and periods proposed in
de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille (2018), and to the multi-period DID estimator proposed by
Imai and Kim (2018). In Section 4, we explain the differences between those three estimators.
More recently, Borusyak and Jaravel (2017), Abraham and Sun (2018), Athey and Imbens (2018),
Callaway and Sant’Anna (2018), and Goodman-Bacon (2018) study the special case of staggered
adoption designs, where the treatment of a group is weakly increasing over time. Those papers
derive some important results specific to that design that we do not consider here. Still, some
of the results in those papers are related to ours, and we describe precisely those connections
later in the paper. The most important dimension on which our paper differs from those is
that our results apply to any two-way fixed effects regressions, not only to those with staggered
adoption. In our survey of the AER papers estimating two-way fixed effects regressions, less
than 10% have a staggered adoption design. This suggests that while staggered adoptions are
an important research design, they may account for a relatively small minority of the applications
where two-way fixed effects regressions have been used.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the set-up. Section 3 presents our
decomposition results. Section 4 introduces our alternative estimator. Section 5 briefly describes
some of the extensions covered in our Web Appendix. Section 6 presents our survey of the articles
published in the AER, and our two empirical applications.
2 Set up
One considers observations that can be divided into G groups and T periods. For every (g, t) ∈
{1, ..., G}× {1, ..., T}, let Ng,t denote the number of observations in group g at period t, and let
N =
∑
g,tNg,t be the total number of observations. The data may be an individual-level panel
or repeated cross-section data set where groups are, say, individuals’ county of birth. The data
could also be a cross-section where cohort of birth plays the role of time. For instance, Duflo
(2001) compares the schooling of different cohorts in Indonesia, some of which were exposed to
a school construction program. It is also possible that for all (g, t), Ng,t = 1, e.g. a group is one
individual or firm. All of the above are special cases of the data structure we consider.
One is interested in measuring the effect of a treatment on some outcome. Throughout the paper
3In fact, a preliminary version of our main result appeared in a working paper version of de Chaisemartin and
D’Haultfœuille (2018) (see Theorems S1 and S2 in de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille, 2015).
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we assume that treatment is binary, but our results apply to any ordered treatment, as we show in
Section ?? of the Web Appendix. Then, for every (i, g, t) ∈ {1, ..., Ng,t}×{1, ..., G}×{1, ..., T}, let
Di,g,t and (Yi,g,t(0), Yi,g,t(1)) respectively denote the treatment status and the potential outcomes
without and with treatment of observation i in group g at period t.
The outcome of observation i in group g and period t is Yi,g,t = Yi,g,t(Di,g,t). For all (g, t), let
Dg,t =
1
Ng,t
Ng,t∑
i=1
Di,g,t, Yg,t(0) =
1
Ng,t
Ng,t∑
i=1
Yi,g,t(0), Yg,t(1) =
1
Ng,t
Ng,t∑
i=1
Yi,g,t(1), and Yg,t =
1
Ng,t
Ng,t∑
i=1
Yi,g,t.
Dg,t denotes the average treatment in group g at period t, while Yg,t(0), Yg,t(1), and Yg,t re-
spectively denote the average potential outcomes without and with treatment and the average
observed outcome in group g at period t.
Throughout the paper, we maintain the following assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Balanced panel of groups) For all (g, t) ∈ {1, ..., G} × {1, ..., T}, Ng,t > 0.
Assumption 1 requires that no group appears or disappears over time. This assumption is often
satisfied. Without it, our results still hold but the notation becomes more complicated as the
denominators of some of the fractions below may then be equal to zero.
Assumption 2 (Sharp design) For all (g, t) ∈ {1, ..., G} × {1, ..., T} and i ∈ {1, ..., Ng,t},
Di,g,t = Dg,t.
Assumption 2 requires that units’ treatments do not vary within each (g, t) cell, a situation we
refer to as a sharp design. This is for instance satisfied when the treatment is a group-level
variable, for instance a county- or a state-law. This is also mechanically satisfied when Ng,t = 1.
In our survey in Section 6.1, we find that almost 80% of the papers using two-way fixed effects
regressions and published in the AER between 2010 and 2012 consider sharp designs. We focus
on sharp designs because of their prevalence, but in Section ?? of the Web Appendix, we show
that all the results in Sections 3-4 below can be extended to fuzzy designs.
Assumption 3 (Independent groups) The vectors (Yg,t(0), Yg,t(1), Dg,t)1≤t≤T are mutually inde-
pendent.
We consider Dg,t, Yg,t(0), Yg,t(1) as random variables. For instance, aggregate random shocks
may affect the average potential outcomes of group g at period t. The treatment status of
group g at period t may also be random. The expectations below are taken with respect to
the distribution of those random variables. Assumption 3 allows for the possibility that the
treatments and potential outcomes of a group may be correlated over time, but it requires that
the potential outcomes and treatments of different groups be independent.
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Assumption 4 (Strong exogeneity) For all (g, t) ∈ {1, ..., G} × {2, ..., T},
E(Yg,t(0)− Yg,t−1(0)|Dg,1, ..., Dg,T ) = E(Yg,t(0)− Yg,t−1(0)).
Assumption 4 requires that the shocks affecting a group’s Yg,t(0) be mean independent of that
group’s treatment sequence. This rules out the possibility that a group gets treated because it
experiences negative shocks, the so-called Ashenfelter’s dip (see Ashenfelter, 1978). Assumption
4 is related to the strong exogeneity condition in panel data models, which, as is well-known, is
necessary to obtain the consistency of the fixed effects estimator (see, e.g., Wooldridge, 2002).
We now define the FE regression described in the introduction.4
Regression 1 (Fixed-effects regression)
Let β̂fe denote the coefficient of Dg,t in an OLS regression of Yi,g,t on group fixed effects, period
fixed effects, and Dg,t. Let βfe = E
[
β̂fe
]
.5
For all g and t, let Ng,. =
∑T
t=1Ng,t and N.,t =
∑G
g=1Ng,t respectively denote the total number of
observations in group g and in period t. For any variable Xg,t defined in each (g, t) cell, let Xg,. =∑T
t=1(Ng,t/Ng,.)Xg,t denote the average value of Xg,t in group g, let X.,t =
∑G
g=1(Ng,t/N.,t)Xg,t
denote the average value of Xg,t in period t, and let X.,. =
∑
g,t(Ng,t/N)Xg,t denote the average
value of Xg,t. For instance, D3,. and D.,2 respectively denote the average treatment in group
3 across time and in period 2 across groups, whereas Y.,. denotes the average value of the
outcome across groups and time. Finally, for any variable Xg,t, we let X denote the vector
(Xg,t)(g,t)∈{1,...,G}×{1,...,T} collecting the values of that variable in each (g, t) cell. For instance, D
is the vector (Dg,t)(g,t)∈{1,...,G}×{1,...,T} collecting the treatments of all the (g, t) cells.
3 Two-way fixed effects regressions
3.1 A decomposition result
We study the FE regression under the following common trends assumption.
Assumption 5 (Common trends) For t ≥ 2, E(Yg,t(0)− Yg,t−1(0)) does not vary across g.
Assumption 5 requires that the expectation of the outcome without treatment follow the same
evolution over time in every group. When t represents birth cohorts, Assumption 5 requires that
the outcome difference between consecutive cohorts be the same across groups.
4 Throughout the paper, we assume that Dg,t in Regression 1 and Dg,t − Dg,t−1 in Regression 2 below are
not collinear with the other independent variables in those regressions, so β̂fe and β̂fd are well-defined.
5As the independent variables in Regression 1 are constant within each (g, t) cell, Regression 1 is equivalent
to a (g, t)-level regression of Yg,t on group and period fixed effects and Dg,t, weighted by Ng,t.
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Let N1 =
∑
i,g,tDi,g,t denote the number of treated units, let
∆TR =
1
N1
∑
(i,g,t):Dg,t=1
[Yi,g,t(1)− Yi,g,t(0)]
denote the average treatment effect across all treated units, and let δTR = E
[
∆TR
]
denote the
expectation of that parameter, hereafter referred to as the ATT. For any (g, t) ∈ {1, ..., G} ×
{1, ..., T}, let
∆g,t =
1
Ng,t
Ng,t∑
i=1
[Yi,g,t(1)− Yi,g,t(0)]
denote the ATE in cell (g, t). δTR is equal to the expectation of a weighted average of the treated
cells’ ∆g,ts:
δTR = E
 ∑
g,t:Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
∆g,t
 . (2)
Under the common trends assumption, we show that βfe is also equal to the expectation of a
weighted sum of the ∆g,ts, with potentially some negative weights.
Let εg,t denote the residual of observations in cell (g, t) in the regression of Dg,t on group and
period fixed effects:6
Dg,t = α + γg + λt + εg,t.
One can show that if the regressors in Regression 1 are not collinear, the average value of εg,t
across all treated (g, t) cells differs from 0:
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
(Ng,t/N1)εg,t 6= 0. Then we let wg,t denote
εg,t divided by that average:
wg,t =
εg,t∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
εg,t
.
Theorem 1 Suppose that Assumptions 1-5 hold. Then,7
βfe = E
 ∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
wg,t∆g,t
 .
6 εg,t arises from a unit-level regression, where the dependent and independent variables only vary at the (g, t)
level. Therefore, all the units in the same (g, t) cell have the same value of εg,t.
7 In the proof, we show the following, stronger result:
E
[
β̂fe
∣∣∣D] = ∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
wg,tE [∆g,t|D] .
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This result implies that in general, βfe 6= δTR, so β̂fe is a biased estimator of the ATT. To
illustrate this, we consider a simple example of a staggered adoption design with two groups and
three periods, and where the treatments are non-stochastic: group 1 is untreated at periods 1
and 2 and treated at period 3, while group 2 is untreated at period 1 and treated both at periods
2 and 3.8 We also assume that Ng,t/Ng,t−1 does not vary across g: all groups experience the
same growth of their number of observations from t− 1 to t, a requirement that is for instance
satisfied when the data is a balanced panel. Then, one can show that
εg,t = Dg,t −Dg,. −D.,t +D.,.,
thus implying that
ε1,3 = 1− 1/3− 1 + 1/2 = 1/6,
ε2,2 = 1− 2/3− 1/2 + 1/2 = 1/3,
ε2,3 = 1− 2/3− 1 + 1/2 = −1/6.
The residual is negative in group 2 and period 3, because the regression predicts a treatment
probability larger than one in that cell, a classic extrapolation problem with linear regressions.
Then, under the common trends assumption, it follows from Theorem 1 and the fact that the
treatments are non-stochastic that
βfe = 1/2E [∆1,3] + E [∆2,2]− 1/2E [∆2,3] .
βfe is equal to a weighted sum of the ATEs in group 1 at period 3, group 2 at period 2, and group
2 at period 3, the three treated (g, t) cells. However, the weight assigned to each ATE differs
from 1/3, the proportion that each cell accounts for in the population of treated observations.
Therefore, βfe is not equal to δTR. Perhaps more worryingly, not all the weights are positive: the
weight assigned to the ATE in group 2 period 3 is strictly negative. Consequently, βfe may be a
very misleading measure of the treatment effect. Assume for instance that E [∆1,3] = E [∆2,2] = 1
and E [∆2,3] = 4. At the period when they start receiving the treatment, both groups experience
a modest positive ATE. But this effect builds over time and in period 3, one period after it has
started receiving the treatment, group 2 now experiences a large ATE. Then,
βfe = 1/2× 1 + 1− 1/2× 4 = −1/2.
βfe is strictly negative, while E [∆1,3], E [∆2,2], and E [∆2,3] are all positive. More generally, the
negative weights are an issue if the E [∆g,t]s are heterogeneous, across groups or over time.9 If
E [∆1,3] = E [∆2,2] = E [∆2,3] = 1, then βfe = 1 = δTR.
8 A similar example appears in Borusyak and Jaravel (2017).
9 On the other hand, βfe does not rule out heterogeneous treatment effects within (g, t) cells, as it is identified
by variations across (g, t) cells, and does not leverage any within-cell variation.
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Here is some intuition as to why one weight is negative in this example. It follows from Equation
(7) in the proof of Theorem 1 (see also Theorem 1 in Goodman-Bacon, 2018) that in this simple
example, βfe = (DID1 + DID2)/2, with
DID1 = E(Y2,2)− E(Y2,1)− (E(Y1,2)− E(Y1,1)) ,
DID2 = E(Y1,3)− E(Y1,2)− (E(Y2,3)− E(Y2,2)) .
The first DID compares the evolution of the mean outcome from period 1 to 2 in group 2 and
in group 1. The second one compares the evolution of the mean outcome from period 2 to 3 in
group 1 and in group 2. The control group in the second DID, group 2, is treated both in the
pre and in the post period. Therefore, under the common trends assumption, it follows from
Lemma 1 in Appendix A (a similar result appears in Lemma 1 of de Chaisemartin (2011) and
in Equation (13) of Goodman-Bacon (2018)) that DID1 = E [∆2,2], but
DID2 = E [∆1,3]− (E [∆2,3]− E [∆2,2]).
DID2 is equal to the ATE in group 1 period 3, minus the change in group 2’s ATE between
periods 2 and 3. Intuitively, the mean outcome of groups 1 and 2 may follow different trends
from period 2 to 3 either because group 1 becomes treated, or because group 2’s ATE changes.
The intuition that negative weights arise because β̂fe uses treated observations as controls also
appears in Borusyak and Jaravel (2017).
We now generalize the previous illustration by characterizing the (g, t) cells whose ATEs are
weighted negatively by βfe.
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and for all t ≥ 2 Ng,t/Ng,t−1 does not vary
across g. Then, for all (g, t, t′) such that Dg,t = Dg,t′ = 1, D.,t > D.,t′ implies wg,t < wg,t′.
Similarly, for all (g, g′, t) such that Dg,t = Dg′,t = 1, Dg,. > Dg′,. implies wg,t < wg′,t.
Proposition 1 shows that βfe is more likely to assign a negative weight to periods where a large
fraction of groups are treated, and to groups treated for many periods. Then, negative weights
are a concern when treatment effects differ between periods with many versus few treated groups,
or between groups treated for many versus few periods.
Proposition 1 has interesting implications in staggered adoption designs, a special case of sharp
designs defined as follows.
Assumption 6 (Staggered adoption designs) For all g, Dg,t ≥ Dg,t−1 for all t ≥ 2.
Assumption 6 is satisfied in applications where groups adopt a treatment at heterogeneous dates
(see e.g. Athey and Stern, 2002). In that design, Borusyak and Jaravel (2017) show that βfe
is more likely to assign a negative weight to treatment effects at the last periods of the panel.
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This result is a special case of Proposition 1: in staggered adoption designs, D.,t is increasing in
t, so Proposition 1 implies that wg,t is decreasing in t.10 Proposition 1 also implies that in that
design, groups that adopt the treatment earlier are more likely to receive some negative weights.
Finally, in staggered adoption designs, Athey and Imbens (2018) derive a decomposition of βfe
that resembles to, but differs from, that in Theorem 1. They derive their decomposition under
the assumption that the dates at which each group starts receiving the treatment are randomly
assigned, while we derive ours under a common trends assumption.
3.2 Robustness to heterogeneous treatment effects
Theorem 1 shows that in sharp designs with many groups and periods, β̂fe may be a misleading
measure of the treatment effect under the standard common trends assumption, if the treatment
effect is heterogeneous across groups and time periods. In the corollary below, we propose two
robustness measures that can be used to assess how serious that concern is.
Those robustness measures are defined conditional on D, the vector stacking together the treat-
ments of all the (g, t) cells. Specifically, for all (g, t) ∈ {1, ..., G}×{1, ..., T}, let ∆˜g,t = E (∆g,t|D)
denote the ATE in cell (g, t) conditional on D,11 let ∆˜TR = E
(
∆TR
∣∣D) denote the ATT con-
ditional on D, and let β˜fe = E
(
β̂fe
∣∣∣D). The first measure we consider is the minimal value
of the standard deviation of the ∆˜g,ts under which one could have that β˜fe is of a different sign
than ∆˜TR. Therefore, this summary measure applies to β˜fe and ∆˜TR, rather than βfe and δTR,
the unconditional expectations of β̂fe and ∆TR on which we have focused so far. However, one
can show that when G, the number of groups, goes to infinity, β˜fe − βfe and ∆˜TR − δTR both
converge to 0. So if the number of groups is large, β˜fe and ∆˜TR should not differ much from βfe
and δTR, and our robustness measure “almost” applies to βfe and δTR.
Let
σ(∆˜) =
 ∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
(
∆˜g,t − ∆˜TR
)21/2 ,
σ(w) =
 ∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
(wg,t − 1)2
1/2 .
10Borusyak and Jaravel (2017) assume that the treatment effect of cell (g, t) only depends on the number of
periods since group g has started receiving the treatment, whereas Proposition 1 does not rely on that assumption.
11 ∆˜g,t may differ from E(∆g,t). To see this, let us consider a simple example where T = 2. Then, under
Assumption 3, one has ∆˜g,t = E (∆g,t|Dg,1, Dg,2). One may for instance have E (∆g,1|Dg,1 = 0, Dg,2 = 0) <
E (∆g,1|Dg,1 = 1, Dg,2 = 1), if a group is more likely to be treated if her treatment effect is initially high.
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σ(∆˜) is the standard deviation of the conditional ATEs, and σ(w) is the standard deviation of
the w-weights,12 across the treated (g, t) cells. Let n = #{(g, t) : Dg,t = 1} denote the number of
treated cells. For every i ∈ {1, ..., n}, let w(i) denote the ith largest of the weights of the treated
cells: w(1) ≥ w(2) ≥ ... ≥ w(n), and let N(i) and ∆˜(i) be the number of observations and the
conditional ATE of the corresponding cell. Then, for any k ∈ {1, ..., n}, let Pk =
∑
i≥kN(i)/N1,
Sk =
∑
i≥k(N(i)/N1)w(i) and Tk =
∑
i≥k(N(i)/N1)w
2
(i).
Corollary 1 Suppose that Assumptions 1-5 hold.
1. If σ(w) > 0, the minimal value of σ(∆˜) compatible with β˜fe and ∆˜TR = 0 is
σfe =
|β˜fe|
σ(w)
.
2. If β˜fe 6= 0 and at least one of the wg,t weights is strictly negative, the minimal value of
σ(∆˜) compatible with β˜fe and with ∆˜g,t of a different sign than β˜fe for all (g, t) is
σ
fe
=
|β˜fe|
[Ts + S2s/(1− Ps)]1/2
,
where s = min{i ∈ {1, ..., n} : w(i) < −S(i)/(1− P(i))}.
σfe and σfe can be estimated simply by replacing β˜fe by β̂fe. An estimator of σfe can be used
to assess the robustness of β̂fe to treatment effect heterogeneity across groups and periods. If
σfe is close to 0, β˜fe and ∆˜TR can be of opposite signs even under a small and plausible amount
of treatment effect heterogeneity. In that case, treatment effect heterogeneity would be a serious
concern for the validity of β̂fe. On the contrary, if σfe is very large, β˜fe and ∆˜TR can only be
of opposite signs under a very large and implausible amount of treatment effect heterogeneity.
Then, treatment effect heterogeneity is less of a concern.
Similarly, if σ
fe
is close to 0, one may have, say, β˜fe > 0, while ∆˜g,t ≤ 0 for all (g, t), even if the
dispersion of the ∆˜g,ts across (g, t) cells is relatively small. Notice that σfe is only defined if at
least one of the weights is strictly negative: if all the weights are positive, then one cannot have
that β˜fe is of a different sign than all the ∆˜g,ts.
When some of the weights wg,t are negative, β̂fe may still be robust to heterogeneous treatment
effects across groups and periods, provided the assumption below is satisfied.
Assumption 7 (w uncorrelated with ∆˜) E
[∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
(wg,t − 1)(∆˜g,t − ∆˜TR)
]
= 0.
Corollary 2 If Assumptions 1-5 and 7 hold, then βfe = δTR.
12 One can show that
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
(Ng,t/N1)wg,t = 1.
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Assumption 7 requires that the weights attached to the fixed effects estimator be uncorrelated
with the conditional ATEs in the treated (g, t) cells. This is often implausible. For instance,
groups treated the most are also those with the lowest value of wg,t, as shown in Proposition 1.
But those groups could also be those with the largest treatment effect. This would then induce
a negative correlation between w and ∆˜. The plausibility of Assumption 7 can be assessed, by
looking at whether w is correlated with a predictor of the treatment effect in each (g, t) cell. In
the two applications we revisit in Section 6, this test is rejected.
3.3 Extension to the first-difference regression
Instead of Regression 1, many articles have estimated the first-difference regression defined below:
Regression 2 (First-difference regression)
Let β̂fd denote the coefficient of Dg,t−Dg,t−1 in an OLS regression of Yg,t−Yg,t−1 on period fixed
effects and Dg,t −Dg,t−1, among observations for which t ≥ 2. Let βfd = E
[
β̂fd
]
.
When T = 2 and Ng,2/Ng,1 does not vary across g, meaning that all groups experience the same
growth of their number of units from period 1 to 2, one can show that β̂fe = β̂fd. β̂fe differs
from β̂fd if T > 2 or Ng,2/Ng,1 varies across g.
We start by showing that a result similar to Theorem 1 also applies to β̂fd. For any (g, t) ∈
{1, ..., G}×{2, ..., T}, let εfd,g,t denote the residual of observations in group g and at period t in
the regression of Dg,t −Dg,t−1 on period fixed effects, among observations for which t ≥ 2. For
any g ∈ {1, ..., G}, let εfd,g,1 = εfd,g,T+1 = 0. One can show that if the regressors in Regression
2 are not perfectly collinear,∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
(
εfd,g,t − Ng,t+1
Ng,t
εfd,g,t+1
)
6= 0.
Then we define
wfd,g,t =
εfd,g,t − Ng,t+1Ng,t εfd,g,t+1∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
(
εfd,g,t − Ng,t+1Ng,t εfd,g,t+1
) .
Theorem 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1-5 hold. Then,
βfd = E
 ∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
wfd,g,t∆g,t
 .
Theorem 2 shows that under Assumption 5, βfd is equal to a weighted sum of the ATEs in
each treated (g, t) cell with potentially some strictly negative weights, just as βfe. We now
characterize the (g, t) cells whose ATEs are weighted negatively by βfd. To do so, we focus on
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staggered adoption designs, as outside of this case it is more difficult to characterize those cells.
Our characterization relies on the fact that for every t ∈ {2, ..., T}, εfd,g,t = Dg,t − Dg,t−1 −
(D.,t −D.,t−1). εfd,g,t is the difference between the change of the treatment in group g between
t− 1 and t, and the average change of the treatment across all groups.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1-2 and 6 hold and for all g, Ng,t does not depend on
t. Then, for all (g, t) such that Dg,t = 1, wfd,g,t < 0 if and only if Dg,t−1 = 1 and D.,t−D.,t−1 >
D.,t+1 −D.,t (with the convention that D.,T+1 = D.,T ).
Proposition 2 shows that for all t ∈ {2, ..., T − 1} such that the increase in the proportion of
treated units is larger from t− 1 to t than from t to t + 1, the period-t ATE of groups already
treated in t−1 receives a negative weight. Moreover, if, at period T , at least one group becomes
treated, the ATE of groups already treated in T − 1 also receives a negative weight. Therefore,
the treatment effect arising at the date when a group starts receiving the treatment does not
receive a negative weight, only long-run treatment effects do. Then, negative weights are a
concern when instantaneous and long-run treatment effects may differ. Proposition 2 also shows
that the prevalence of negative weights depends on how the number of groups that start receiving
the treatment at date t evolves with t. Assume for instance that this number decreases with
t: many groups start receiving the treatment at date 1, a bit less start at date 2, etc., a case
hereafter referred to as the “more early adopters” case. Then, if Ng,t is constant across (g, t),
D.,t − D.,t−1 is decreasing in t, and all the long-run treatment effects receive negative weights,
except maybe those of period T if D.,T = D.,T−1. Conversely, assume that the number of groups
that start receiving the treatment at date t increases with t: few groups start receiving the
treatment at date 1, a bit more start at date 2, etc., a case hereafter referred to as the “more
late adopters” case. Then, if Ng,t is constant across (g, t), D.,t − D.,t−1 is increasing in t, and
only the period-T long-run treatment effects receive negative weights. Overall, negative weights
are much more prevalent in the “more early adopters” than in the “more late adopters” case.
We now come back to general sharp designs where the treatment may not follow a staggered
adoption. Let β˜fd = E
(
β̂fd
∣∣∣D) denote the expectation of β̂fd conditional on the vector of
treatment assignments D. Just as for β˜fe, one can show that the minimal value of σ(∆˜)
compatible with β˜fd and ∆˜TR = 0 is σfd = |β˜fd|/σ(wfd), where
σ(wfd) =
 ∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
(wfd,g,t − 1)2
1/2
is the standard deviation of the wfd-weights. One can also show that σfd, the minimal value
of σ(∆˜) compatible with β˜fd and ∆˜g,t of a different sign than β˜fd for all (g, t), has the same
expression as σ
fe
, except that one needs to replace the weights wg,t by the weights wfd,g,t in its
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definition. Estimators of σfe and σfd (or σfe and σfd) can then be used to determine which of
β̂fe or β̂fd is more robust to heterogeneous treatment effects.
Finally, and similarly to the result shown in Corollary 2 for βfe, βfd is equal to δTR under
common trends and the following assumption:
Assumption 8 (wfd uncorrelated with ∆˜) E
[∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
(wfd,g,t − 1)(∆g,t −∆TR)
]
= 0.
Note that under the common trends assumption, one can jointly test Assumption 8 and As-
sumption 7, the assumption that the weights attached to βfe are uncorrelated with the ∆g,ts: if
β̂fe and β̂fd are significantly different, at least one of these two assumptions must fail. In the
second application we revisit in Section 6, β̂fe and β̂fd are significantly different.
4 An alternative estimator
In this section, we show that it is possible to estimate a well-defined causal effect even if treatment
effects are heterogeneous across groups or over time. Let
δS = E
 1
NS
∑
(i,g,t):t≥2,Dg,t 6=Dg,t−1
[Yi,g,t(1)− Yi,g,t(0)]
 ,
with NS =
∑
(g,t):t≥2,Dg,t 6=Dg,t−1 Ng,t. δ
S is the ATE of all switching cells. In staggered adoption
designs, δS is the average of the treatment effect at the time when a group starts receiving the
treatment, across all groups that become treated at some point.
We now show that δS can be unbiasedly estimated by a weighted average of DID estimators.
This result holds under the following supplementary assumptions.
Assumption 9 (Strong exogeneity for Y (1)) For all (g, t) ∈ {1, ..., G} × {2, ..., T},
E(Yg,t(1)− Yg,t−1(1)|Dg,1, ..., Dg,T ) = E(Yg,t(1)− Yg,t−1(1)).
Assumption 9 is the equivalent of Assumption 4, for the potential outcome with treatment. It
requires that the shocks affecting a group’s Yg,t(1) be mean independent of that group’s treatment
sequence.
Assumption 10 (Common trends for Y (1)) For t ≥ 2, E(Yg,t(1) − Yg,t−1(1)) does not vary
across g.
Again, Assumption 10 is the equivalent of Assumption 5, for the potential outcome with treat-
ment. It requires that between each pair of consecutive periods, the expectation of the outcome
with treatment follow the same evolution over time in every group. Assumptions 9 and 10 en-
sure that one can reconstruct the potential outcome that groups leaving the treament between
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t− 1 and t would have experienced if they had remained treated. In staggered adoption designs,
Assumption 9 and 10 are not necessary for identification, because no group leaves the treatment.
Together, Assumptions 5 and 10 imply that the ATE follows the same evolution over time in
every group: E (∆g,t) = ηt + θg.13 This still allows for heterogeneous treatment effects across
groups and over time.14
Assumption 11 (Existence of “stable” groups) For all t ∈ {2, ..., T}:
1. If there is at least one g ∈ {1, ..., G} such that Dg,t−1 = 0 and Dg,t = 1, then there exists
at least one g′ 6= g, g′ ∈ {1, ..., G} such that Dg′,t−1 = Dg′,t = 0.
2. If there is at least one g ∈ {1, ..., G} such that Dg,t−1 = 1, Dg,t = 0, then there exists at
least one g′ 6= g, g′ ∈ {1, ..., G} such that Dg′,t−1 = Dg′,t = 1.
The first point of the stable groups assumption requires that between each pair of consecutive
time periods, if there is a “joiner” (i.e., a group switching from being untreated to treated), then
there should be another group that is untreated at both dates. The second point requires that
between each pair of consecutive time periods, if there is a “leaver” (i.e., a group switching from
being treated to untreated), then there should be another group that is treated at both dates.
Notice that under Assumption 11, groups’ treatments are not independent, so Assumption 3
cannot hold. Accordingly, we replace Assumption 3 by Assumption 12 below. Assumption 12
requires that conditional on its own treatments, a group’s outcomes be mean independent of the
other groups’ treatments. It is weaker than Assumption 3. Assumption 11 is necessary to show
that our estimator is unbiased, but it is not necessary to show that it is consistent. Accordingly,
in Section ?? of the Web Appendix, we show that our estimator is consistent under Assumption
3. For every g ∈ {1, ..., G}, let Dg = (D1,g, ..., DT,g).
Assumption 12 (Mean independence between a group’s outcome and other groups treatments)
For all g and t, E(Yg,t(0)|D) = E(Yg,t(0)|Dg) and E(Yg,t(1)|D) = E(Yg,t(1)|Dg).
We can now define our estimator. For all t ∈ {2, ..., T} and for all (d, d′) ∈ {0, 1}2, let
Nd,d′,t =
∑
g:Dg,t=d,Dg,t−1=d′
Ng,t (3)
13 It should be possible to weaken Assumptions 9-10, in particular to account for dynamic effects where ∆g,t
may depend on (Dg,1, ..., Dg,t−1). This would however introduce complications that are beyond the scope of this
paper.
14Imposing Assumptions 9 and 10 does not change the decompositions obtained in Theorems 1 and 2. Yg,t(1) is
observed for all the treated (g, t) cells entering these decompositions, so those assumptions do not bring identifying
information for those cells.
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denote the number of observations with treatment d′ at period t− 1 and d at period t. Let
DID+,t =
∑
g:Dg,t=1,Dg,t−1=0
Ng,t
N1,0,t
(Yg,t − Yg,t−1)−
∑
g:Dg,t=Dg,t−1=0
Ng,t
N0,0,t
(Yg,t − Yg,t−1) ,
DID−,t =
∑
g:Dg,t=Dg,t−1=1
Ng,t
N1,1,t
(Yg,t − Yg,t−1)−
∑
g:Dg,t=0,Dg,t−1=1
Ng,t
N0,1,t
(Yg,t − Yg,t−1) .
Note that DID+,t is not defined when there is no group such thatDg,t = 1, Dg,t−1 = 0, or no group
such that Dg,t = 0, Dg,t−1 = 0. In such instances, we let DID+,t = 0. Similarly, let DID−,t = 0
when there is no group such that Dg,t = 1, Dg,t−1 = 1 or no group such that Dg,t = 0, Dg,t−1 = 1.
Finally, let
DIDM =
T∑
t=2
(
N1,0,t
NS
DID+,t +
N0,1,t
NS
DID−,t
)
.
Theorem 3 If Assumptions 1, 2, 4, 5, and 9-12 hold, E [DIDM] = δS.
In Section ?? of the Web Appendix, we also show that when G goes to infinity, DIDM is a
consistent and asymptotically normal estimator of δS. The DIDM estimator is computed by the
fuzzydid and did_multiplegt Stata packages.
Here is the intuition underlying Theorem 3. DID+,t compares the evolution of the mean outcome
between t − 1 and t in two sets of groups: the joiners, and those remaining untreated. Under
Assumptions 4 and 5, DID+,t estimates the joiners’ treatment effect. Similarly, DID−,t compares
the evolution of the outcome between t− 1 and t in two sets of groups: those remaining treated,
and the leavers. Under Assumptions 9 and 10, it estimates the leavers’ treatment effect. Finally,
DIDM is a weighted average of those DIDs. Note that in staggered designs, there are no groups
whose treatment decreases over time, so DIDM is only a weighted average of the DID+,t estima-
tors. Note also that one can separately estimate the joiners’ and the leavers’ treatment effect,
by computing separately weighted averages of the DID+,t and DID−,t estimators. The former
estimator only relies on Assumptions 4 and 5, while the latter only relies on Assumptions 9 and
10.
DIDM is related to two other estimators. First, it is related to the Wald-TC estimator in point
2 of Theorem S1 in the Web Appendix of de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille (2018), but the
weighting of DID+,t and DID−,t therein differs. As a result, DIDM estimates ∆S under weaker
assumptions. DIDM is also related to the multi-period DID estimator in Imai and Kim (2018).
However, the multi-period DID estimator is a weighted average of the DID+,t, so it does not
estimate the leavers’ treatment effect, and applies to a smaller population. Besides, Imai and
Kim (2018) do not establish the properties of their estimator. Finally, they do not generalize it
to non-binary treatments, something we do in Section ?? of the Web Appendix.
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There may be a bias-variance trade-off between DIDM and the two-way fixed effects regression
estimators. For instance, assume that Regression 1 is correctly specified:
Yg,t(0) = αg + λt + εg,t,
Yg,t(1)− Yg,t(0) = δ,
E(εg,t|D) = 0.
Then, if the errors εg,t are homoskedastic and uncorrelated, it follows from the Gauss-Markov
theorem that β̂fe is the linear estimator of δ, the constant treatment effect parameter, with the
lowest variance. As DIDM is also an unbiased linear estimator of δ, the variance of β̂fe must be
lower than that of DIDM. With heteroskedastic or correlated errors, one can construct examples
where the variance of β̂fe is higher than that of DIDM, but this still suggests that DIDM may
often have a larger variance than that of β̂fe, as we find in our applications in Section 6.
DIDM uses groups whose treatment is stable to infer the trends that would have affected switchers
if their treatment had not changed. This strategy could fail, if switchers experience different
trends than groups whose treatment is stable. To assess if this is a serious concern, we propose
to use the following placebo estimator, that essentially compares the outcome’s evolution from
t − 2 to t − 1, in groups that switch and do not switch treatment between t − 1 and t. This
placebo estimator is defined under a modified version of Assumption 11.
Assumption 13 (Existence of “stable” groups for the placebo test) For all t ∈ {3, ..., T}:
1. If there is at least one g ∈ {1, ..., G} such that Dg,t−2 = Dg,t−1 = 0 and Dg,t = 1, then
there exists at least one g′ 6= g, g′ ∈ {1, ..., G} such that Dg′,t−2 = Dg′,t−1 = Dg′,t = 0.
2. If there is at least one g ∈ {1, ..., G} such that Dg,t−2 = Dg,t−1 = 1, Dg,t = 0, then there
exists at least one g′ 6= g, g′ ∈ {1, ..., G} such that Dg′,t−2 = Dg′,t−1 = Dg′,t = 1.
For all t ∈ {2, ..., T} and for all (d, d′, d′′) ∈ {0, 1}3, let
Nd,d′,d′′,t =
∑
g:Dg,t=d,Dg,t−1=d′,Dg,t−2=d′′
Ng,t
denote the number of observations with treatment status d′′ at period t− 2, d′ at period t− 1,
and d at period t. Let
NplS =
∑
(g,t):t≥3,Dg,t 6=Dg,t−1=Dg,t−2
Ng,t,
DIDpl+,t =
∑
g:Dg,t=1,Dg,t−1=Dg,t−2=0
Ng,t
N1,0,0,t
(Yg,t−1 − Yg,t−2)−
∑
g:Dg,t=Dg,t−1=Dg,t−2=0
Ng,t
N0,0,0,t
(Yg,t−1 − Yg,t−2) ,
DIDpl−,t =
∑
g:Dg,t=Dg,t−1=Dg,t−2=1
Ng,t
N1,1,1,t
(Yg,t−1 − Yg,t−2)−
∑
g:Dg,t=0,Dg,t−1=Dg,t−2=1
Ng,t
N0,1,1,t
(Yg,t−1 − Yg,t−2) .
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When there is no group such that Dg,t = 1, Dg,t−1 = Dg,t−2 = 0 or no group such that Dg,t =
Dg,t−1 = Dg,t−2 = 0, we let DIDpl+,t = 0, and we adopt the same convention for DID
pl
−,t = 0. Let
DIDplM =
T∑
t=3
(
N1,0,0,t
NplS
DIDpl+,t +
N0,1,1,t
NplS
DIDpl−,t
)
.
Theorem 4 If Assumptions 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12, and 13 hold, then E
[
DIDplM
]
= 0.
DIDpl+,t compares the evolution of the mean outcome from t − 2 to t − 1 in two sets of groups:
those untreated at t − 2 and t − 1 but treated at t, and those untreated at t − 2, t − 1, and t.
If Assumptions 4 and 5 hold, then E
[
DIDpl+,t
]
= 0. Similarly, if Assumptions 9 and 10 hold,
E
[
DIDpl−,t
]
= 0. Then, E
[
DIDplM
]
= 0 is a testable implication of Assumptions 4, 5, 9, and 10,
so finding DIDplM significantly different from 0 would imply that those assumptions are violated:
groups that switch treatment experience different trends before that switch than the groups used
to reconstruct their counterfactual trends when they switch.15 Note that DIDplM compares the
trends of switching and stable groups one period before the switch. One can define other placebo
estimators comparing those trends, say, two or three periods before the switch. DIDplM and all
those other placebo estimators are computed by the did_multiplegt Stata package.
5 Extensions
In this section, we briefly review some of the extensions in our Web Appendix. First, we show
that the decomposition of βfe in Theorem 1 can be extended to fuzzy designs where the treatment
varies within (g, t) cells, to applications with a non binary treatment, and to two-way fixed effects
regressions with control variables.16 In fuzzy designs or with a non-binary treatment, the weights
in Theorem 1 remain essentially unchanged.
We also consider two-way fixed effects regressions with covariates. Specifically, we study the
coefficient of Dg,t in a regression of Yi,g,t on group and period fixed effects, Dg,t, and a vector of
covariates Xg,t. We show that a result very similar to Theorem 1 applies to that coefficient, up
to two differences. First, including covariates allows for different trends across groups, provided
those differential trends are fully accounted for by a linear model in Xg,t−Xg,t−1, the change in
a group’s covariates. Specifically, instead of Assumptions 4 and 5, one needs to assume that
E (Yg,t(0)|Dg,Xg)− E (Yg,t−1(0)|Dg,Xg) = (Xg,t −Xg,t−1)′γ + λt,
15See also Callaway and Sant’Anna (2018), who propose another placebo test in staggered adoption designs.
16The decomposition of βfd in Theorem 2 can also be extended to all of those cases.
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for some vector γ and constant λt, and where Xg = (Xg,1, ..., Xg,T ). Importantly, when the
covariates are group-specific linear trends, the equation above is equivalent to
E (Yg,t(0)|Dg,Xg)− E (Yg,t−1(0)|Dg,Xg) = γg + λt,
meaning that from t − 1 to t, the evolution of Y (0) in group g should deviate from its group-
specific linear trend γg by an amount λt common to all groups. Second, the residual εg,t in the
weights in Theorem 1 has to be replaced by εXg,t, the residual of observations in cell (g, t) in the
regression of Dg,t on group and period fixed effects and Xg,t. Some of the corresponding weights
may still be negative, as in Theorem 1. Overall, two-way fixed effects regressions with covariates
may rely on a more plausible common trends assumptions than those without covariates, but
they still require that the treatment effect be homogeneous, across time and between groups.
Third, we show that under the common trends assumption and the assumption that the ATE
of a (g, t) cell does not change over time, βfe and βfd identify weighted sums of the ATEs of the
(g, t) cells whose treatment changes between t− 1 and t. In sharp designs, the weights attached
to βfd are all positive, while for βfe, the same only holds in staggered adoption designs.
Fourth, we show that our DIDM estimator can easily be extended to non-binary, discrete treat-
ments. Then, we define it as a weighted average of DIDs comparing the evolution of the outcome
in groups whose treatment went from d to d′ between t−1 and t and in groups with a treatment
of d at both dates, across all possible values of d, d′, and t.
Finally, our twowayfeweights, fuzzydid, and did_multiplegt Stata packages can handle all
of those extensions.
6 Applicability, and applications
6.1 Applicability
We conducted a review of all papers published in the American Economic Review (AER) between
2010 and 2012 to assess the importance of two-way fixed effects regressions in economics. Over
these three years, the AER published 337 papers. Out of these 337 papers, 33 or 9.8% of them
estimate the FE or FD Regression, or other regressions resembling closely those regressions.
When one withdraws from the denominator theory papers and lab experiments, the proportion
of papers using these regressions raises to 19.1%.
19
Table 1: Papers using two-way fixed effects regressions published in the AER
2010 2011 2012 Total
Papers using two-way fixed effects regressions 5 14 14 33
% of published papers 5.2% 12.2% 11.2% 9.8%
% of empirical papers, excluding lab experiments 12.8% 23.0% 19.2% 19.1%
Notes. This table reports the number of papers using two-way fixed effects regressions published in the AER
from 2010 to 2012.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics about the 33 2010-2012 AER papers estimating two-way
fixed effects regressions. Panel A shows that 13 use the FE regression; six use the FD regression;
six use regressions the FE or FD regression with several treatment variables; three use the FE or
FD 2SLS regression discussed in Section ?? of the Web Appendix; five use other regressions that
we deemed sufficiently close to the FE or FD regression to include them in our count.17 Panel B
shows that more than three fourths of those papers consider sharp designs, while less than one
fourth consider fuzzy designs. Finally, Panel C assesses whether, in those applications, there are
groups whose exposure to the treatment remains stable between each pair of consecutive time
periods, the condition that has to be met to be able to compute the DIDM estimator. For about
a half of the papers, reading the paper was not enough to assess this with certainty. We then
assessed whether they presumably have stable groups or not. Overall, 12 papers have stable
groups, 14 presumably have stable groups, five presumably do not have stable groups, and two
do not have stable groups.
In Section ?? of the Web Appendix, we review each of the 33 papers. We explain where two-way
fixed effects regressions are used in the paper, and we detail our assessment of whether the design
is a sharp or a fuzzy design, and of whether the stable groups assumption holds or not.
17For instance, two papers use regressions with three-way fixed-effects instead of two-way fixed effects.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics on two-way fixed effects papers
# Papers
Panel A. Estimation method
Fixed-effects OLS regression 13
First-difference OLS regression 6
Fixed-effects or first-difference OLS regression, with several treatment variables 6
Fixed-effects or first-difference 2LS regression 3
Other regression 5
Panel B. Research design
Sharp design 26
Fuzzy design 7
Panel C. Are there stable groups?
Yes 12
Presumably yes 14
Presumably no 5
No 2
Notes. This table reports the estimation method and the research design used in the 33 papers using two-way
fixed effects regressions published in the AER from 2010 to 2012, and whether those papers have stable groups.
6.2 Application to Gentzkow et al. (2011)
Gentzkow et al. (2011) study the effect of newspapers on voters’ turnout in US presidential
elections between 1868 and 1928. They regress the first-difference of the turnout rate in county
g between election years t − 1 and t on state-year fixed effects and on the first difference of
the number of newspapers available in that county. This corresponds to Regression 2, with
state-year fixed effects as controls. As reproduced in Table 3 below, Gentzkow et al. (2011) find
that β̂fd = 0.0026 (s.e.= 9× 10−4). According to this regression, one more newspaper increased
voters’ turnout by 0.26 percentage points. On the other hand, β̂fe = −0.0011 (s.e.= 0.0011).
β̂fe and β̂fd are significantly different (t-stat=2.86).
We use the twowayfeweights Stata package, downloadable with its help file from the SSC
repository, to estimate the weights attached to β̂fe. 6,212 are strictly positive, 4,161 are strictly
negative. The negative weights sum to -0.53. σ̂fe = 3 × 10−4, meaning that βfe and the ATT
may be of opposite signs if the standard deviation of the ATEs across all the treated (g, t) cells
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is equal to 0.0003.18 σ̂
fe
= 7× 10−4, meaning that βfe may be of a different sign than the ATEs
of all the treated (g, t) cells if the standard deviation of those ATEs is equal to 0.0007. We also
estimate the weights attached to β̂fd. 5,472 are strictly positive, and 4,605 are strictly negative.
The negative weights sum to -1.43. σ̂fd = 4× 10−4, and σ̂fd = 6× 10−4.
Therefore, βfe and βfd can only receive a causal interpretation if the weights attached to them
are uncorrelated with the intensity of the treatment effect in each county×election-year cell
(Assumptions 7 and 8, respectively). This is not warranted. First, as β̂fe and β̂fd significantly
differ, Assumptions 7 and 8 cannot jointly hold. Moreover, the weights attached to β̂fe and
β̂fd are correlated with variables that are likely to be themselves associated with the intensity
of the treatment effect in each cell. For instance, the correlation between the weights attached
to β̂fd and t, the year variable, is equal to −0.06 (t-stat=-3.28). The effect of newspapers
may be different in the last than in the first years of the panel. For instance, new means of
communication, like the radio, appear in the end of the period under consideration, and may
diminish the effect of newspapers.19 This would lead to a violation of Assumption 8.
The stable groups assumption holds: between each pair of consecutive elections, there are coun-
ties where the number of newspapers does not change. We use the fuzzydid Stata package,
downloadable with its help file from the SSC repository, to estimate a modified version of our
DIDM estimator, that accounts for the fact that the number of newspapers is not binary (see
section ?? of our Web Appendix, where we define this modified estimator). We include state-
year fixed effects as controls in our estimation. We find that DIDM = 0.0043, with a standard
error of 0.0015. DIDM is 66% larger than β̂fd, and the two estimators are significantly different
at the 10% level (t-stat=1.69). DIDM is also of a different sign than β̂fe.
Our DIDM estimator only relies on a common trends assumption. To assess its plausibility, we
compute DIDplM, the placebo estimator introduced in Section 4.
20 As shown in Table 3 below,
our placebo estimator is small and not significantly different from 0, meaning that counties
where the number of newspapers increased or decreased between t− 1 and t did not experience
significantly different trends in turnout from t− 2 to t− 1 than counties where that number was
stable. Our placebo estimator is estimated on a subset of the data: for each pair of consecutive
time periods t− 1 and t, we only keep counties where the number of newspapers did not change
between t− 2 and t− 1. Still, almost 80% of the county × election-year observations are used in
the computation of the placebo estimator. Moreover, when reestimated on this subsample, the
DIDM estimator is very close to the DIDM estimator in the full sample.
18The number of newspapers is not binary, so strictly speaking, in this application the parameter of interest is
the average causal response parameter introduced in Section ?? of our Web Appendix, rather than the ATT.
19 In fact, Gentzkow et al. (2011) analyze the 1868 to 1928 period separately from later periods, because the
growth of the radio may have changed newspapers’ effects.
20Again, we need to slightly modify DIDplM to account for the fact that the number of newspapers is not binary.
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Table 3: Estimates of the effect of one additional newspaper on turnout
Estimate Standard error N
β̂fd 0.0026 0.0009 15,627
β̂fe -0.0011 0.0011 16,872
DIDM 0.0043 0.0015 16,872
DIDplM -0.0009 0.0016 13,221
DIDM, on placebo subsample 0.0045 0.0019 13,221
Notes. This table reports estimates of the effect of one additional newspaper on turnout, as well as a placebo
estimate of the common trends assumption underlying DIDM. Estimators are computed using the data of
Gentzkow et al. (2011), with state-year fixed effects as controls. Standard errors are clustered by county. To
compute the DIDM estimators, the number of newspapers is grouped into 4 categories: 0, 1, 2, and more than 3.
6.3 The effect of union membership on wages
A number of articles have estimated the effect of union membership on wages using panel data
and controlling for workers’ fixed effects. For instance, Jakubson (1991) has found a 8.3% union
membership premium using that strategy, in a sample of American males from the PSID followed
from 1976 to 1980. Vella and Verbeek (1998) estimate a similar regression and find similar results,
in a sample of young American males from the NLSY followed from 1980 to 1987.21
We use the data in Vella and Verbeek (1998) to compute various estimators of the union wage
premium. As union status is often measured with error (see, e.g. Freeman, 1984; Card, 1996),
we discard changes in union status happening twice in three consecutive years. Specifically,
for individuals with Di,t−1 = 0, Di,t = 1, and Di,t+1 = 0, we replace Di,t by 0. Similarly, for
individuals with Di,t−1 = 1, Di,t = 0, and Di,t+1 = 1, we replace Di,t by 1. Doing so, we discard
half of the union status changes in the initial data.22
We start by estimating a two-way fixed effects regression of wages on union membership with
worker and year fixed effects. Table 4 below shows that β̂fe = 0.107 (s.e.= 0.030), a result close
to that of the worker fixed effects regressions in Jakubson (1991) and Vella and Verbeek (1998).
Then, we estimate the weights attached to β̂fe. 820 are strictly positive, 196 are strictly negative,
but the negative weights only sum to -0.01. Still, σ̂fe = 0.097, meaning that βfe and the ATTmay
be of opposite signs if the standard deviation of the treatment effect across the unionized worker
× year observations is equal to 0.097, a substantial but still possible amount of heterogeneity.
21The fixed effects regression is not the main specification in Vella and Verbeek (1998). The authors favor
instead a dynamic selection model.
22 Keeping the original data does not change much the results presented below, except that the placebo
estimator DIDpl,2M becomes significant.
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The weights are negatively correlated with workers’ years of schooling (correlation =−0.12, t-stat
=−1.88). The union premium may be lower for more educated workers (see Freeman and Medoff,
1984), as they may be less substitutable than less educated ones. Then, β̂fe may overestimate
δTR, the average union premium across all unionized worker × year observations. We also find
that β̂fd = 0.060 (s.e.= 0.032) and that β̂fe and β̂fd significantly differ (t-stat=1.91),23 thus
casting further doubt on Assumptions 7 and 8.
The stable groups assumption holds: between each pair of consecutive years, there are workers
whose union membership status does not change. We therefore compute our DIDM estimator.
Table 4 shows that it is equal to 0.041 (s.e.= 0.034). DIDM is significantly different from β̂fe
(t-stat=2.60) and β̂fd (t-stat=2.36).24 As discussed in Section 4, we can also estimate separately
the union premium for workers joining and leaving a union, something that was previously done
by Freeman (1984). The joiners’ effect estimate is equal to 0.059 (s.e.= 0.053), the leavers’ effect
is equal to 0.021 (s.e.= 0.044), and the two estimates do not significantly differ (t-stat= 0.55).
DIDM relies on a common trends assumption. To assess its plausibility, we compute DIDplM,
the placebo estimator introduced in Section 4. DIDplM compares the wage growth of workers
changing and not changing their union status one period before that change. We also compute
DIDpl,2M and DID
pl,3
M , two other placebo estimators performing the same comparison two and three
periods before the change. As shown in Table 4 below, DIDplM is large, positive, and significant
(t-stat=2.49). On the other hand DIDpl,2M and DID
pl,3
M are smaller and insignificant. Workers that
become unionized start experiencing a differential positive pre-trend one year before becoming
unionized. This differential pre-trend mostly comes from union joiners: for them, the placebo
estimator is equal to 0.119 (s.e.= 0.051), while for union leavers the placebo is smaller (0.061)
and insignificant (s.e.= 0.057). Therefore, the placebos suggest that even the already small and
insignificant DIDM estimator may overestimate the union premium, due to a positive pre-trend.
In fact, the estimate of leavers’ effect, for which there is no evidence of a pre-trend, is very close
to 0. Overall, our results indicate that there may not be a significant union wage premium.
23The standard error of β̂fe − β̂fd is computed with a worker-level clustered bootstrap.
24The standard errors of β̂fe −DIDM and β̂fd −DIDM are computed with a worker-level clustered bootstrap.
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Table 4: Estimates of the union premium
Estimate Standard error N
β̂fe 0.107 0.030 4,360
β̂fd 0.060 0.032 3,815
DIDM 0.041 0.034 3,815
DIDplM 0.094 0.038 3,101
DIDpl,2M -0.041 0.030 2,458
DIDpl,3M -0.004 0.033 1,881
Notes. This table reports estimates of the effect of the union premium, as well as placebo estimators of the
common trends assumption. Estimators are computed using the data of Vella and Verbeek (1998). Standard
errors are clustered at the worker level.
7 Conclusion
Almost 20% of empirical articles published in the AER between 2010 and 2012 use regressions
with groups and period fixed effects to estimate treatment effects. In this paper, we show that
under a common trends assumption, those regressions estimate weighted sums of the treatment
effect in each group and period. The weights may be negative: in one application, we find that
almost 50% of the weights are negative. The negative weights are an issue when the treatment
effect is heterogeneous, between groups or over time. Then, one could have that the treatment’s
coefficient in those regressions is negative while the treatment effect is positive in every group
and time period. We therefore propose a new estimator to address this problem. This estimator
estimates the treatment effect in the groups that switch treatment, at the time when they
switch. It does not rely on any treatment effect homogeneity condition. It is computed by the
fuzzydid and did_multiplegt Stata packages. In the two applications we revisit, this estimator
is significantly and economically different from the two-way fixed effects estimators.
25
References
Abraham, S. and Sun, L. (2018), Estimating dynamic treatment effects in event studies with
heterogeneous treatment effects. Working Paper.
Ashenfelter, O. (1978), ‘Estimating the effect of training programs on earnings’, The Review of
Economics and Statistics pp. 47–57.
Athey, S. and Imbens, G. W. (2018), Design-based analysis in difference-in-differences settings
with staggered adoption, Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Athey, S. and Stern, S. (2002), ‘The impact of information technology on emergency health care
outcomes’, The RAND Journal of Economics 33(3), 399–432.
Autor, D. H. (2003), ‘Outsourcing at will: The contribution of unjust dismissal doctrine to the
growth of employment outsourcing’, Journal of labor economics 21(1), 1–42.
Borusyak, K. and Jaravel, X. (2017), Revisiting event study designs. Working Paper.
Callaway, B. and Sant’Anna, P. H. (2018), Difference-in-differences with multiple time periods
and an application on the minimum wage and employment. arXiv e-print 1803.09015.
Card, D. (1996), ‘The effect of unions on the structure of wages: A longitudinal analysis’,
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society pp. 957–979.
de Chaisemartin, C. (2011), Fuzzy differences in differences. Working Paper 2011-10, Center for
Research in Economics and Statistics.
de Chaisemartin, C. and D’Haultfoeuille, X. (2015), Fuzzy differences-in-differences. ArXiv
e-prints, eprint 1510.01757v2.
de Chaisemartin, C. and D’Haultfœuille, X. (2018), ‘Fuzzy differences-in-differences’, The Review
of Economic Studies 85(2), 999–1028.
de Chaisemartin, C., D’Haultfœuille, X. and Guyonvarch, Y. (2019), ‘Fuzzy differences-in-
differences with Stata’, Stata Journal 19(2), 435–458.
Duflo, E. (2001), ‘Schooling and labor market consequences of school construction in indonesia:
Evidence from an unusual policy experiment’, American Economic Review 91(4), 795–813.
Frank, M. and Wolfe, P. (1956), ‘An algorithm for quadratic programming’, Naval research
logistics quarterly 3(1-2), 95–110.
26
Freeman, R. B. (1984), ‘Longitudinal analyses of the effects of trade unions’, Journal of labor
Economics 2(1), 1–26.
Freeman, R. B. and Medoff, J. L. (1984), ‘What do unions do’, Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 38, 244.
Gentzkow, M., Shapiro, J. M. and Sinkinson, M. (2011), ‘The effect of newspaper entry and exit
on electoral politics’, American Economic Review 101(7), 2980–3018.
Goodman-Bacon, A. (2018), Difference-in-differences with variation in treatment timing. Work-
ing Paper.
Imai, K. and Kim, I. S. (2018), ‘On the use of two-way fixed effects regression models for causal
inference with panel data’.
Jakubson, G. (1991), ‘Estimation and testing of the union wage effect using panel data’, The
Review of Economic Studies 58(5), 971–991.
Vella, F. and Verbeek, M. (1998), ‘Whose wages do unions raise? a dynamic model of unionism
and wage rate determination for young men’, Journal of Applied Econometrics 13(2), 163–183.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002), Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data, MIT press.
27
A Proofs
One useful lemma
Our results rely on the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If Assumptions 1-5 hold, for all (g, g′, t, t′) ∈ {1, ..., G}2 × {1, ..., T}2,
E (Yg,t|D)− E (Yg,t′ |D)− (E (Yg′,t|D)− E (Yg′,t′|D))
=Dg,tE (∆g,t|D)−Dg,t′E (∆g,t′ |D)− (Dg′,tE (∆g′,t|D)−Dg′,t′E (∆g′,t′ |D)) .
Proof of Lemma 1
For all (g, t) ∈ {1, ..., G} × {1, ..., T},
E (Yg,t|D) =E
(
1
Ng,t
Ng,t∑
i=1
Yi,g,t
∣∣∣∣∣D
)
=E
(
1
Ng,t
Ng,t∑
i=1
(Yi,g,t(0) +Di,g,t(Yi,g,t(1)− Yi,g,t(0)))
∣∣∣∣∣D
)
=E (Yg,t(0)|D) +Dg,tE (∆g,t|D)
=E (Yg,t(0)|Dg) +Dg,tE (∆g,t|D) ,
where the third equality follows from Assumption 2, and the fourth from Assumption 3. There-
fore,
E (Yg,t|D)− E (Yg,t′ |D)− (E (Yg′,t|D)− E (Yg′,t′|D))
=E (Yg,t(0)− Yg,t′(0)|Dg)− E (Yg′,t(0)− Yg′,t′(0)|Dg′)
+Dg,tE (∆g,t|D)−Dg,t′E (∆g,t′ |D)− (Dg′,tE (∆g′,t|D)−Dg′,t′E (∆g′,t′ |D))
=E (Yg,t(0)− Yg,t′(0))− E (Yg′,t(0)− Yg′,t′(0))
+Dg,tE (∆g,t|D)−Dg,t′E (∆g,t′ |D)− (Dg′,tE (∆g′,t|D)−Dg′,t′E (∆g′,t′ |D))
=Dg,tE (∆g,t|D)−Dg,t′E (∆g,t′ |D)− (Dg′,tE (∆g′,t|D)−Dg′,t′E (∆g′,t′|D)) ,
where the first equality follows from Assumption 3, the second from the linearity of the condi-
tional expectation and Assumption 4, and the third from Assumption 5.
Proof of Theorem 1
It follows from the Frisch-Waugh theorem and the definition of εg,t that
E
(
β̂fe
∣∣∣D) = ∑g,tNg,tεg,tE (Yg,t|D)∑
g,tNg,tεg,tDg,t
. (4)
28
Now, by definition of εg,t again,
T∑
t=1
Ng,tεg,t = 0 for all g ∈ {1, ..., G}, (5)
G∑
g=1
Ng,tεg,t = 0 for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}. (6)
Then, ∑
g,t
Ng,tεg,tE (Yg,t|D)
=
∑
g,t
Ng,tεg,t (E (Yg,t|D)− E (Yg,1|D)− E (Y1,t|D) + E (Y1,1|D)) (7)
=
∑
g,t
Ng,tεg,t (Dg,tE (∆g,t|D)−Dg,1E (∆g,1|D)−D1,tE (∆1,t|D) +D1,1E (∆1,1|D))
=
∑
g,t
Ng,tεg,tDg,tE (∆g,t|D)
=
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,tεg,tE (∆g,t|D) . (8)
The first and third equalities follow from Equations (5) and (6). The second equality follows
from Lemma 1. The fourth equality follows from Assumption 2. Finally, Assumption 2 implies
that ∑
g,t
Ng,tεg,tDg,t =
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,tεg,t. (9)
Combining (4), (8), (9) yields
E
(
β̂fe
∣∣∣D) = ∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
wg,tE (∆g,t|D) . (10)
Then, the result follows from the law of iterated expectations.
Proof of Proposition 1
If for all t ≥ 2 Ng,t/Ng,t−1 does not depend on t, then it follows from the first order conditions
attached to Regression 1 and a few lines of algebra that εg,t = Dg,t−Dg,.−D.,t+D.,.. Therefore,
wg,t is proportional to Dg,t −Dg,. −D.,t +D.,.. Then, for all (g, t, t′) such that Dg,t = Dg,t′ = 1,
D.,t > D.,t′ implies wg,t < wg,t′ . Similarly, for all (g, g′, t) such that Dg,t = Dg′,t = 1, Dg,. > Dg′,.
implies wg,t < wg′,t.
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Proof of Corollary 1
Proof of the first point
We start by proving the first point. If the assumptions of the corollary hold and ∆˜TR = 0, then β˜fe =
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
wg,t∆˜g,t,
0 =
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
∆˜g,t,
where the first equality follows from (10). These two conditions and the Cauchy-Schwarz in-
equality imply
|β˜fe| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
(wg,t − 1)(∆˜g,t − ∆˜TR)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ σ(w)σ(∆˜).
Hence, σ(∆˜) ≥ σfe.
Now, we prove that we can rationalize this lower bound. Let us define
∆˜TRg,t =
β˜fe (wg,t − 1)
σ2(w)
.
Then,
∆˜TR =
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
β˜fe (wg,t − 1)
σ2(w)
=
β˜fe
σ2(w)
 ∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
wg,t − 1
 = 0,
as it follows from the definition of wg,t that
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
wg,t = 1.
Similarly, ∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
wg,t
β˜fe (wg,t − 1)
σ2(w)
=
β˜fe
σ2(w)
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
wg,t (wg,t − 1)
=
β˜fe
σ2(w)
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
(wg,t − 1)2
= β˜fe,
where the second equality follows again from the fact that
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
wg,t = 1.
Proof of the second point
We first suppose that β˜fe > 0. We seek to solve:
min
∆˜(1),...,∆˜(n)
n∑
i=1
N(i)
N1
(
∆˜(i) − ∆˜TR
)2
s.t. β˜fe =
n∑
i=1
N(i)
N1
w(i)∆˜(i),
∆˜(i) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
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This is a quadratic programming problem, with a matrix that is symmetric positive but not
definite. Hence, by Frank and Wolfe (1956) and the fact that the linear term in the quadratic
problem is 0, the solution exists if and only if the set of constraints is not empty. If w(n) ≥ 0, the
set of constraints is empty because
∑n
i=1
N(i)
N1
w(i)∆˜(i) ≤ 0 < β˜fe. On the other hand, if w(n) < 0,
this set is non-empty since it includes (0, ..., 0, β˜fe/(P(n)w(n))).
We now derive the corresponding bound. For that purpose, remark that
n∑
i=1
N(i)
N1
(
∆˜(i) −
n∑
i=1
N(i)
N1
∆˜(i)
)2
=
n∑
i=1
N(i)
N1
∆˜2(i) −
(
n∑
i=1
N(i)
N1
∆˜(i)
)2
.
The Karush–Kuhn–Tucker necessary conditions for optimality are that for all i:
∆˜(i) = ∆˜
TR + λw(i) − γ(i),
n∑
i=1
N(i)
N1
w(i)∆˜(i) = β˜fe,
γ(i) ≥ 0,
γ(i)∆˜(i) = 0,
where ∆˜TR =
∑n
i=1
N(i)
N1
∆˜(i), 2λ is the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint
∑n
i=1
N(i)
N1
w(i)∆˜(i) =
β˜fe and 2
N(i)
N1
γ(i) is the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint ∆˜(i) ≤ 0.
These constraints imply that ∆˜(i) = 0 if and only if ∆˜TR+λw(i) ≥ 0. Therefore, if ∆˜TR+λw(i) <
0, ∆˜(i) 6= 0 so γ(i) = 0, and ∆˜(i) = ∆˜TR + λw(i). Therefore,
∆˜(i) = min(∆˜
TR + λw(i), 0). (11)
This equation implies that ∆˜(i) ≤ ∆˜TR + λw(i), which in turn implies that ∆˜TR ≤ ∆˜TR + λ, so
λ ≥ 0.
As a result, ∆˜TR + λw(i) is decreasing in i, and because x 7→ min(x, 0) is increasing, ∆˜(i) is also
decreasing in i. Then ∆˜(n) < 0: otherwise one would have ∆˜(i) = 0 for all i which would imply
β˜fe = 0, a contradiction. Let s = min{i ∈ {1, ..., n} : ∆˜(i) < 0}. Using again (11), we get
∆˜TR =
∑
i≥s
N(i)
N1
∆˜(i) = Ps∆˜
TR + λSs.
Therefore,
∆˜TR =
λSs
1− Ps . (12)
Hence, plugging ∆˜ in (11), we obtain that for all i ≥ s,
∆˜(i) = λ
{
Ss
1− Ps + w(i)
}
.
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Finally, using again (11), we obtain
β˜fe =
∑
i≥s
N(i)
N1
w(i)∆˜(i) = λ
{
S2s
1− Ps + Ts
}
.
Thus,
λ =
β˜fe
Ts + S2s/(1− Ps)
.
Then, using what precedes,
σ2
fe
=
∑
i≥s
N(i)
N1
(
λw(i)
)2
+
∑
i<s
N(i)
N1
(
∆˜TR
)2
=λ2Ts + (1− Ps)
(
λSs
1− Ps
)2
=λ2
[
Ts +
S2s
1− Ps
]
=
β˜2fe
Ts + S2s/(1− Ps)
.
The result follows, once noted that Equations (11) and (12) imply that s = min{i ∈ {1, ..., n} :
w(i) < −S(i)/(1− P(i))}.
Finally, consider the case β˜fe < 0. By letting ∆˜′(i) = −∆˜(i) and β˜′fe = −β˜fe, we have
σ
fe
= min
∆˜′
(1)
≤0,...,∆˜′
(n)
≤0
n∑
i=1
N(i)
N1
∆˜′(i)
2 −
(
n∑
i=1
N(i)
N1
∆˜′(i)
)2
s.t.
n∑
i=1
N(i)
N1
w(i)∆˜
′
(i) = β˜
′
fe.
This is the same program as before, with β˜′fe instead of β˜fe. Therefore, by the same reasoning
as before, we obtain
σ2
fe
=
(β˜′fe)
2
Ts + S2s/(1− Ps)
=
β˜2fe
Ts + S2s/(1− Ps)
.
Proof of Corollary 2
We have
βfe = E
 ∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
wg,t∆˜g,t

= E
 ∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
wg,t
 ∆˜TR

= E
(
∆˜TR
)
= δTR.
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The first equality follows from the law of iterated expectations and (10). The second equality
follows from Assumption 7. By the definition of wg,t,
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
wg,t = 1, hence the third
equality. The fourth equality follows from the law of iterated expectations.
Proof of Theorem 2
It follows from the Frisch-Waugh theorem and the definition of εfd,g,t that
E
(
β̂fd
∣∣∣D) = ∑(g,t):t≥2Ng,tεfd,g,t (E (Yg,t|D)− E (Yg,t−1|D))∑
(g,t):t≥2Ng,tεfd,g,t (Dg,t −Dg,t−1)
. (13)
Now, by definition of εfd,g,t again,
G∑
g=1
Ng,tεfd,g,t = 0 for all t ∈ {2, ..., T}. (14)
Then, ∑
(g,t):t≥2
Ng,tεfd,g,t (E (Yg,t|D)− E (Yg,t−1|D))
=
∑
(g,t):t≥2
Ng,tεfd,g,t (E (Yg,t|D)− E (Yg,t−1|D)− E (Y1,t|D)− E (Y1,t−1|D))
=
∑
(g,t):t≥2
Ng,tεfd,g,t
(
Dg,t∆˜g,t −Dg,t−1∆˜g,t−1 −D1,t∆˜1,t +D1,t−1∆˜1,t−1
)
=
∑
(g,t):t≥2
Ng,tεfd,g,t
(
Dg,t∆˜g,t −Dg,t−1∆˜g,t−1
)
=
∑
g,t
(Ng,tεfd,g,t −Ng,t+1εfd,g,t+1)Dg,t∆˜g,t
=
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
(
εfd,g,t − Ng,t+1
Ng,t
εfd,g,t+1
)
∆˜g,t. (15)
The first and third equalities follow from (14). The second equality follows from Lemma 1. The
fourth equality follows from a summation by part, and from the fact εfd,g,1 = εfd,g,T+1 = 0. The
fifth equality follows from Assumption 2.
A similar reasoning yields∑
(g,t):t≥2
Ng,tεfd,g,t (Dg,t −Dg,t−1) =
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
(
εfd,g,t − Ng,t+1
Ng,t
εfd,g,t+1
)
. (16)
Combining (13), (15), (16), and the law of iterated expectations yields the result.
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Proof of Proposition 2
It follows from the first order conditions attached to Regression 2 and a few lines of algebra that
εfd,g,t = Dg,t −Dg,t−1 −D.,t + D.,t−1. Therefore, under Assumption 6 and if Ng,t does not vary
across t, one has that for all (g, t) such that Dg,t = 1, 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, wfd,g,t is proportional to
1−Dg,t−1−(2D.,t −D.,t−1 −D.,t+1). D.,t−D.,t−1 ≤ 1, and under Assumption 6 D.,t−D.,t+1 ≤ 0,
so 1−Dg,t−1 − (2D.,t −D.,t−1 −D.,t+1) can only be strictly negative if Dg,t−1 = 1. Then, for all
(g, t) such that Dg,t = 1, 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, wfd,g,t is strictly negative if and only if Dg,t−1 = 1 and
2D.,t −D.,t−1 −D.,t+1 > 0.
Similarly, when t = T , under the same assumptions as above, one has that for all g such
that Dg,T = 1, wfd,g,T is proportional to 1 − Dg,T−1 − (D.,T − D.,T−1). D.,T − D.,T−1 ≤ 1, so
1−Dg,T−1− (D.,T −D.,T−1) can only be strictly negative if Dg,T−1 = 1. Then, wfd,g,T is strictly
negative if and only if Dg,T−1 = 1 and D.,T −D.,T−1 > 0.
Finally, when t = 1, one has that for all g such that Dg,1 = 1, Dg,2 = 1 under Assumption 6, so
wfd,g,1 is proportional to D.,2 −D.,1, which is greater than 0 under Assumption 6.
Proof of Theorem 3
First, by definition of DIDM,
E (DIDM) =
T∑
t=2
E
((
N1,0,t
NS
E (DID+,t|D) + N0,1,t
NS
E (DID−,t|D)
))
. (17)
Let t be greater than 2, and let us focus for now on the case where there is at least one g1 such
that Dg1,t−1 = 0 and Dg1,t = 1. Then Assumption 11 ensures that there is a least another group
g2 such that Dg2,t−1 = Dg2,t = 0. For every g such that Dg,t−1 = 0 and Dg,t = 1, we have
E (Yg,t − Yg,t−1|D) =E (∆g,t|D) + E (Yg,t(0)− Yg,t−1(0)|D) . (18)
Under Assumptions 12, 4, and 5, for all t ≥ 2, there exists a real number ψ0,t such that for all g
E (Yg,t(0)− Yg,t−1(0)|D) = E (Yg,t(0)− Yg,t−1(0)|Dg) = E (Yg,t(0)− Yg,t−1(0)) = ψ0,t. (19)
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Then,
N1,0,tE (DID+,t|D)
=
∑
g:Dg,t=1,Dg,t−1=0
Ng,tE (∆g,t|D) +
∑
g:Dg,t=1,Dg,t−1=0
Ng,tE (Yg,t(0)− Yg,t−1(0)|D)
− N1,0,t
N0,0,t
∑
g:Dg,t=Dg,t−1=0
Ng,tE (Yg,t(0)− Yg,t−1(0)|D)
=
∑
g:Dg,t=1,Dg,t−1=0
Ng,tE (∆g,t|D) + ψ0,t
 ∑
g:Dg,t=1,Dg,t−1=0
Ng,t − N1,0,t
N0,0,t
∑
g:Dg,t=Dg,t−1=0
Ng,t

=
∑
g:Dg,t=1,Dg,t−1=0
Ng,tE (∆g,t|D) . (20)
The first equality follows by (18), the second by (19), and the third after some algebra. If there
is no g such that Dg,t−1 = 0 and Dg,t = 1, (20) still holds, as DID+,t = 0 in this case.
A similar reasoning yields
N0,1,tE (DID−,t|D) =
∑
g:Dg,t=0,Dg,t−1=1
Ng,tE (∆g,t|D) (21)
Plugging (20) and (21) into (17) yields
E(DIDM) =
T∑
t=2
E
E
 1
NS
 ∑
g:Dg,t=1,Dg,t−1=0
Ng,t∆g,t +
∑
g:Dg,t=0,Dg,t−1=1
Ng,t∆g,t
∣∣∣∣∣∣D

=δS.
Proof of Theorem 4
First, as with DIDM, we have
E
(
DIDplM
)
=
T∑
t=3
E
((
N1,0,0,t
NplS
E
(
DIDpl+,t
∣∣∣D)+ N0,1,1,t
NplS
E
(
DIDpl−,t
∣∣∣D))) . (22)
Let t be greater than 3, and let us for now focus on the case where there exists at least one g1
such that Dg1,t−2 = Dg1,t−1 = 0 and Dg1,t = 1. Then Assumption 13 ensures that there is a least
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another group g2 such that Dg2,t−2 = Dg2,t−1 = Dg2,t = 0. Then,
N1,0,0,tE
(
DIDpl+,t
∣∣∣D)
=
∑
g:Dg,t=1,Dg,t−1=Dg,t−2=0
Ng,tE (Yg,t−1(0)− Yg,t−2(0)|D)
− N1,0,0,t
N0,0,0,t
∑
g:Dg,t=Dg,t−1=Dg,t−2=0
Ng,tE (Yg,t−1(0)− Yg,t−2(0)|D)
=ψ0,t−1
 ∑
g:Dg,t=1,Dg,t−1=Dg,t−2=0
Ng,t − N1,0,0,t
N0,0,0,t
∑
g:Dg,t=Dg,t−1=Dg,t−2=0
Ng,t

=0. (23)
The second equality follows by (19), and the third follows after some algebra. If there exists no
g such that Dg,t−2 = Dg,t−1 = 0 and Dg,t = 1, (23) still holds, as DIDpl+,t = 0 in this case.
A similar reasoning yields
N0,1,1,tE
(
DIDpl−,t
∣∣∣D) = 0 (24)
The result follows after plugging (23) and (24) into (22).
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Abstract
In this web appendix, we first discuss whether common trends necessarily implies ho-
mogenous treatment effect. Second, we show that the decomposition in Theorem 1 in
the paper extends to fuzzy designs, to regressions with covariates, to regressions with a
non-binary treatment, and we derive another decomposition under the supplementary as-
sumption that the treatment effect does not change over time. Third, we extend the DIDM
estimator to non-binary treatments. Fourth, we discuss inference. Fifth, we review all the
papers included in our survey of papers published in the AER between 2010 and 2012 (see
Section 6 of the paper). Finally, the last section gathers the proofs of all the additional
results in this Web Appendix.
1 Can common trends hold with heterogeneous treatment effects?
Throughout the paper, we assume that groups experience common trends, but that the effect of
the treatment may be heterogeneous between groups and / or over time. We now discuss two
examples where this may happen. We then argue that the mechanisms behind these examples are
fairly general. Thus treatment effects are often likely to be heterogeneous, even when common
trends are plausible.
First, assume one wants to learn the effect of the minimum wage on the employment levels of
some US counties. For simplicity, let us assume that the minimum wage can only take two
values, a low and a high value. Also, let us assume that there are only two periods, the 90s
and the 2000s. Between these two periods, the amount of competition from China for the US
industry increased substantially. Thus, for the common trends assumption to hold for counties
A and B, the effect of that increase in competition should be the same on averge in those two
∗University of California at Santa Barbara, clementdechaisemartin@ucsb.edu
†CREST, xavier.dhaultfoeuille@ensae.fr
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counties, in the counterfactual state of the world where A and B have a low minimum wage at
both dates. For that to be true, the economy of those two counties should be pretty similar.
For instance, if A has a very service-oriented economy, while B has a very industry-oriented
economy, it is unlikely that their employment levels will react similarly to Chinese competition.
Now, if the economies of A and B are similar, they should also have similar effects of the
minimum wage on employment, thus implying that the treatment effect is homogenous between
groups. On the other hand, the treatment effect may vary over time. For instance, the drop in
the employment levels of A and B due to Chinese competition will probably be higher if their
minimum wage is high than if their minimum wage is low. This is equivalent to saying that
the effect of the minimum wage on employment diminishes from the first to the second period:
due to Chinese competition in the second period, the minimum wage may have a more negative
effect on employment then.1
Second, assume one wants to learn the effect of a job training program implemented in some
US counties on participants’ wages. Let us suppose that individuals self-select into the training
according to a Roy model:
Di,g,t = 1{Yi,g,t(1)− Yi,g,t(0) > cg,t}, (23)
where cg,t represents the cost of the training for individuals in county g and period t. We consider
fuzzy designs such as this one in the next section. Here, the common trends condition requires
that average wages without the training follow the same evolution in all counties. As above,
for this to hold counties used in the analysis should have similar economies, so let us assume
that those counties are actually identical copies of each other: at each period, their distribution
of wages without and with the training is the same. Therefore, (g, t) 7→ E(Yg,t(1) − Yg,t(0)) is
constant. However, cg,t may vary across counties and over time: some counties may subsidize
the training more than others, and some counties may change their subsidies over time. Then,
(g, t) 7→ E(Yi,g,t(1) − Yi,g,t(0)|Di,g,t = 1) will not be constant, despite the fact that all counties
in the sample have similar economies and experience similar trends on their wages.
Overall, when the treatment is assigned at the group × period level as in the minimum wage
example, the economic restrictions underlying the common trends assumption may also imply
homogeneous treatment effect between groups. However, those restrictions usually do not imply
that the treatment effect is constant over time. Moreover, when the treatment is assigned at
the individual level, as in the job training example, the economic restrictions underlying the
common trends assumption neither imply homogeneous treatment effects between groups, nor
homogeneous treatment effects over time.
1 To simplify our discussion, in this example we consider only two counties. But in order to estimate consis-
tently average treatment effects in the presence of county-specific shocks, the number of groups should tend to
infinity, as in Section 5 below.
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2 Results in fuzzy designs
In this section, the research design may be fuzzy: the treatment may vary within (g, t) cells.
For instance, Enikolopov et al. (2011) study the effect of having access to an independent TV
channel in Russia, and in each Russian region some people have access to that channel while
other people do not.
2.1 Generalizing the decomposition of βfe to fuzzy designs
For any (g, t) ∈ {1, ..., G} × {1, ..., T}, let
∆TRg,t =
1
Ng,tDg,t
∑
i:Di,g,t=1
[Yi,g,t(1)− Yi,g,t(0)]
denote the average treatment effect across the treated units of cell cell (g, t). One has
δTR = E
(∑
g,t
Ng,tDg,t
N1
∆TRg,t
)
,
which generalizes (2) to fuzzy designs.2 Theorem 1 shows that βfe is also equal to the expectation
of a weighted sum of the ∆TRg,t s. Let
wTRg,t =
εg,t∑
g,t
Ng,tDg,t
N1
εg,t
.
Theorem S1 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 3-5 hold. Then,
βfe = E
(∑
g,t
Ng,tDg,t
N1
wTRg,t ∆
TR
g,t
)
.
Theorem S1 shows that in fuzzy designs, βfe is equal to the expectation of a weighted sum of
the ATTs in each (g, t) cell. Again, some of the weights may be strictly negative. Note that
under Assumption 2, Theorem S1 reduces to Theorem 1 in the paper.
The weights have a simple expression in the following special case.
Assumption S1 (Heterogenous adoption) T = 2 and for all g ∈ {1, ..., G}, Dg,2 > Dg,1 = 0.
Assumption S1 is satisfied in applications with two time periods, and where all groups are fully
untreated at t = 1 and partly treated at t = 2. This type of design often arises in practice, for
instance when an innovation is heterogeneously adopted by various groups.
2Any equation with a numbering lower than (23) refers to an equation in the paper.
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Proposition S1 If Assumptions 1 and S1 hold and Ng,2/Ng,1 does not vary across g, then3
wTRg,2 =
Dg,2 −D.,2∑G
g=1
Ng,2
N1
(Dg,2 −D.,2)2
.
Proposition S1 shows that in the heterogeneous adoption design, βfe assigns negative weights
to the period-two ATT of groups with a mean treatment lower than the mean treatment in the
full population. The reason why negative weights arise is intuitive. With two periods, the FE
regression is equivalent to a regression of the first difference of the outcome on the period-two
treatment in each group. This regression compares the evolution of the outcome in more- and
less-treated groups. Doing so, it subtracts the treatment effect of the less-treated groups, hence
the negative weights. Negative weights are a concern if the ATTs of the less- and more-treated
groups systematically differ. This could be the case if treatment is determined by a Roy selection
model. Then, the groups with the highest proportion of treated units could also be those where
the ATT is the highest. On the other hand, if the proportion of treated units is randomly
assigned to each group, negative weights are not a concern.4
The DIDM estimator can also be generalized to fuzzy designs, see point 2 of Theorem S1 in the
Web Appendix of de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille (2018) for further details.
2.2 Application to Enikolopov et al. (2011)
Enikolopov et al. (2011) study the effect of NTV, an independent TV channel introduced in
1996 in Russia, on the share of the electorate voting for opposition parties. NTV’s coverage
rate was heterogeneous across subregions: while a large fraction of the population received NTV
in urbanized subregions, a smaller fraction received it in more rural subregions. The authors
estimate the FE regression: they regress the share of votes for opposition parties in the 1995
and 1999 elections in Russian subregions on subregion fixed effects, an indicator for the 1999
election, and on the share of the population having access to NTV in each subregion at the
time of the election. In 1995, the share of the population having access to NTV was equal
to 0 in all subregions, while in 1999 it was strictly greater than 0 everywhere. Therefore,
the authors’ research design corresponds exactly to the heterogenous adoption design discussed
above. Enikolopov et al. (2011) find that β̂fe = 6.65 (s.e.= 1.40). According to this regression,
increasing the share of the population having access to NTV from 0 to 100% increases the share
of votes for the opposition parties by 6.65 percentage points. Because there are only two time
periods in the data and the regression is not weighted by subregions’ populations, β̂fe = β̂fd.
We use the twowayfeweights Stata package, downloadable with its help file from the SSC
repository, to compute the weights attached to β̂fe. In 1995, all the weights are equal to zero
3Under Assumption S1, Dg,1 = 0, so wTRg,1 does not enter in the decomposition in Theorem 1.
4Corollaries 1 and 2 extend directly to fuzzy settings.
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because NTV does not exist yet. In 1999, 918 weights (47.4%) are strictly positive, while 1,020
(52.6%) are strictly negative. The negative weights sum to -2.26. σ̂fe = 0.91: βfe and δTR may
be of opposite signs if the standard deviation of the effect of NTV across subregions is above
0.91 percentage point. σ̂
fe
= 1.23: βfe may be of a different sign than the treatment effect in
every subregion if the standard deviation of the effect of NTV across subregions is above 1.23
percentage point, a plausible amount of treatment effect heterogeneity.
Therefore, βfe can only receive a causal interpretation if the effect of NTV is constant across
subregions, or if the weights attached to it are uncorrelated with the intensity of that effect
in each subregion (Assumption 7). These assumptions are not warranted. First, we estimate
β̂fe again, weighting the regression by subregions’ populations. We obtain β̂fe = 14.89, more
than twice its value in the unweighted regression, and the difference between the coefficients is
significant (t-stat=2.46). Therefore, we can reject the null that the treatment effect is constant:
if the treatment effect was constant across subregions, the weighting would not matter so both
the unweighted and the weighted regressions would estimate the same parameter. Second, the
weights attached to β̂fe are correlated with variables that are likely to be themselves associated
with the intensity of the effect in each subregion. For instance, the correlation between the
weights and subregions’ populations is equal to 0.35 (t-stat=14.01). The effect of NTV may be
higher in less populated subregions, as those regions are more rural and fewer other sources of
information may be available there. This would lead to a violation of Assumption 7.
3 Extensions of the decomposition results
We consider hereafter several extensions of our decompositions of βfe and βfd in the paper. First,
we consider decompositions under the common trends assumption, and under the assumption
that the treatment effect is stable over time. Second, we extend our decompositions to ordered
treatments. Third, we investigate the effect of including covariates in the regression. Fourth,
we study two-way fixed effects 2SLS regressions. Throughout, we focus on sharp designs to ease
the exposition. Nevertheless, all the results generalize to fuzzy designs.
3.1 βfe and βfd as weighted sums of ATEs of switching groups
We first show that under an additional condition, βfe and βfd can be written as a weighted sum
of the ATEs of switching groups.
Assumption S2 (Stable treatment effect) For all g and t ≥ 2,
E (∆g,t|D)Dg,t−1 = E (∆g,t−1|D)Dg,t−1.
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The stable treatment effect assumption requires that the ATE of every group treated in t − 1
does not change from t − 1 to t. By iteration, the ATE of a group treated for instance from
period t0 to T is unrestricted before t0 but should be constant from t0 to T . Assumption S2 rules
out the possibility that the treatment effect changes over time. Therefore, it may be implausible
and should be carefully discussed.
We now show that under the common trend and stable treatment effects assumptions, βfe and
βfd may identify weighted averages of ATEs. Let NS =
∑
(g,t):Dg,t 6=Dg,t−1 Ng,t and, for all g and
t ≥ 2,
wSg,t =
(Dg,t −Dg,t−1)
∑
t′≥t
Ng,t′
Ng,t
εg,t′∑
(g,,t):t≥2
[
Ng,t
NS
(Dg,t −Dg,t−1)
∑
t′≥t
Ng,t′
Ng,t
εg,t′
] ,
wSfd,g,t =
(Dg,t −Dg,t−1)εfd,g,t∑
(g,,t):t≥2
Ng,t
NS
(Dg,t −Dg,t−1)εfd,g,t
.
Theorem S2 Suppose that Assumptions 1-5 and S2 hold. Then,
βfe =E
 ∑
(g,t):Dg,t 6=Dg,t−1,t≥2
Ng,t
NS
wSg,t∆g,t
 ,
βfd =E
 ∑
(g,t):Dg,t 6=Dg,t−1,t≥2
Ng,t
NS
wSfd,g,t∆g,t
 .
Moreover, wSfd,g,t ≥ 0 for all g and t ≥ 2. If Assumption 6 holds and Ng,t/Ng,t−1 does not vary
across g for all t ≥ 2, wSg,t ≥ 0 for all g and t ≥ 2.
Theorem S2 shows that in sharp designs, under the common trends and stable treatment effect
assumptions, βfe and βfd identify weighted sums of ATEs of switching cells. The weights differ
from those in Theorems 1 and 2. Now the weights attached to βfe are all positive in staggered
adoption designs, while the weights attached to βfd are all positive in all sharp designs. Therefore,
in staggered adoption (resp. sharp) designs, βfe (resp. βfd) relies on the assumption that the
treatment effect is stable over time, but it does not require that treatment effects be homogeneous
between groups.
3.2 Non-binary, ordered treatment
We now consider the case where the treatment takes a finite number of ordered values, Di,g,t ∈
{0, 1, ..., d}, and show that Theorem 1 can easily be extended to this case.5 We need to define
5Theorem 2 can also be extended to the case of a non-binary treatment.
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potential outcomes for all the possible treatment values. For instance Yi,g,t(d) is the counter-
factual outcome of observation i in cell (g, t) if she receives treatment value d. We also need
to modify the treatment effect parameters we consider. In lieu of δTR, we consider the average
causal response (ACR) on the treated,
δACR = E
(
1
N1
∑
i,g,t
Yi,g,t(Dg,t)− Yi,g,t(0)
)
.
Similarly, for all (g, t) such that Dg,t 6= 0, we consider, instead of ∆g,t,
∆ACRg,t =
1
Ng,tDg,t
Ng,t∑
i=1
[Yi,g,t(Dg,t)− Yi,g,t(0)] .
Then, similarly to (2), the following decomposition holds:
δACR = E
 ∑
(g,t):Dg,t 6=0
Ng,tDg,t
N1
∆ACRg,t
 .
Let wOg,t =
εg,t∑
g,t
Ng,tDg,t
N1
εg,t
. Note that if the treatment is binary, wOg,t = wg,t.
Theorem S3 Suppose that Assumptions 1-5 hold and Di,g,t ∈ {0, ..., d}. Then,
βfe = E
 ∑
(g,t):Dg,t 6=0
Ng,tDg,t
N1
wOg,t∆
ACR
g,t
 .
Theorem S3 shows that under Assumption 5, when the treatment is not binary βfe identifies a
weighted sum of the ACRs in all the (g, t) cells that are not untreated. Then, since the proof of
Corollary 1 does not rely on the nature of the treatment, Corollary 1 directly applies to ordered
treatments as well, by just replacing wg,t and Ng,t by wOg,t and Ng,tDg,t, respectively. Corollary 2
extends as well to this set-up, by simply modifying the no-correlation condition appropriately.
3.3 Including covariates
Often times, researchers also include a vector of covariates Xg,t as control variables in their
regression. In this section, we show that our Theorem 1 can be extended to this case.6 We start
by redefining Regression 1 in this context.
6Theorem 2 can also be extended to regressions with covariates.
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Regression 1X (Fixed-effects regression with covariates)
Let β̂Xfe denote the coefficient of Dg,t in an OLS regression of Yi,g,t on group and period fixed
effects, Dg,t, and Xg,t. Let βXfe = E
(
β̂Xfe
)
.
Then, we need to modify Assumptions 3-5. Hereafter, we let Xg = (Xg,1, ..., Xg,t).
Assumption S3 (Independent groups with covariates) The vectors (Yg,t(0), Yg,t(1), Dg,t, Xg,t)1≤t≤T
are mutually independent.
Assumption S4 (Strong exogeneity and common trends with covariates) There is a vector γ
of same dimension as Xg,t such that
E (Yg,t(0)− Yg,t−1(0)− (Xg,t −Xg,t−1)′γ|Dg,Xg) = E (Yg,t(0)− Yg,t−1(0)− (Xg,t −Xg,t−1)′γ)
and E (Yg,t(0)− Yg,t−1(0)− (Xg,t −Xg,t−1)′γ) does not vary across g.
Rearranging, Assumption S4 requires that
E (Yg,t(0)|Dg,Xg)− E (Yg,t−1(0)|Dg,Xg) = (Xg,t −Xg,t−1)′γ + λt,
for some constant λt. Then, Assumption S4 allows for the possibility that groups experience
different evolutions of their Yg,t(0) over time, but it requires that those differential evolutions
are fully accounted for by a linear model in Xg,t − Xg,t−1, the change in a group’s covariates.
Assumption S4 is implied by the linear model that is often invoked to justify the use of the
FE regression with covariates. For instance, the use of Regression 1X is often justified by the
following model:
Yg,t(0) = γg + λt +X
′
g,tγ + ηg,t, E(ηg,t|Dg,Xg) = 0. (24)
Equation (24) implies Assumption S4, but it does not imply Assumption 5.
An interesting special case is when the control variables are group-specific linear trends. Then,
Assumption s4 requires that for all t ≥ 2,
E (Yg,t(0)|Dg,Xg)− E (Yg,t−1(0)|Dg,Xg) = γg + λt,
for some constants γg and λt. From t− 1 to t, the evolution of Y (0) in group g should deviate
from its group-specific linear trend γg by an amount λt common to all groups. Then, Assumption
S4 is a “common deviation from linear trends” assumption, which may be more plausible than
the standard common trends assumption.
Let εXg,t denote the residual of observations in cell (g, t) in the regression of Dg,t on group and
period fixed effects andXg,t. One can show that if the regressors in Regression 1 are not collinear,
the average value of εXg,t across all treated (g, t) cells differs from 0:
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
(Ng,t/N1)ε
X
g,t 6= 0.
Then, let
wXg,t =
εXg,t∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
εXg,t
.
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Theorem S4 Suppose that Assumptions 1-2 and S3-S4 hold. Then,
βXfe = E
 ∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,t
N1
wXg,t∆g,t
 .
Theorem S4 shows that under a modified version of the common trends assumption accounting
for the covariates, βXfe identifies a weighted sum of the ∆TRg,t s, as βfe in Theorem 1, with different
but still potentially negative weights.7 Assumption S4 may be more plausible than Assumption
5, but adding covariates may increase the prevalence of negative weights, or the correlation
between the weights and the ∆g,ts, thus making βXfe less robust to heterogeneous effects than
βfe.
3.4 2SLS regressions
Researchers have sometimes estimated 2SLS versions of Regressions 1 and 2. Our main con-
clusions also apply to those regressions. Let β̂2SLSfe denote the coefficient of Di,g,t in a 2SLS
regression of Yg,t on group and period fixed effects and Di,g,t, using a variable Zg,t constant
within each group × period as the instrument for Di,g,t. Zg,t typically represents an incentive
for treatment allocated at the group × period level. For instance, Duflo (2001) studies the effect
of years of schooling on wages in Indonesia, using a primary school construction program as
an instrument. Specifically, she estimates a 2SLS regression of wages on cohort and district of
birth fixed effects and years of schooling, using the interaction of belonging to a cohort entering
primary school after the program was completed and the number of schools constructed in one’s
district of birth as the instrument for years of schooling.
Remark that β̂2SLSfe = β̂Yfe/β̂Dfe, where β̂Yfe (resp. β̂Dfe) is the coefficient of Zg,t in the reduced-
form regression of Yg,t (resp. the first-stage regression of Dg,t) on group and period fixed effects
and Zg,t. Then let β2SLSfe = E[β̂Yfe]/E[β̂Dfe].8 Following Imbens and Angrist (1994), for any
z ∈ Supp(Z) let Di,g,t(z) denote the potential treatment of unit i in (g, t) if Zi,g,t = z. It
follows from Theorem 1 that under a common trends assumption on Di,g,t(0), E[β̂Dfe] is equal to
a weighted sum of the average effects of the instrument on the treatment in each group and time
period, with potentially many negative weights. Similarly, under a common trends assumption
7In a previous version of this paper, we had shown that under a different, and arguably less natural, common
trends assumption, βXfe identifies a weighted sum of the ∆
TR
g,t , with the same weights as in Theorem 1. We thank
an anonymous referee for pointing out issues with the common trends assumption we had previously proposed.
8We do not consider here E[β̂2SLSfe ], as the 2SLS estimator may not have an expectation. Moreover, under
conditions similar to those imposed in Section 5 of the paper, β2SLSfe is the probability limit of β̂
2SLS
fe , which
makes β2SLSfe the proper estimand here.
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on Yi,g,t(Di,g,t(0)) instead of Yi,g,t(0), E[β̂Yfe] is equal to a weighted sum of the average effects of
the instrument on the outcome, again with potentially many negative weights. For instance, in
Duflo (2001), under a common trends assumption on Di,g,t(0), the number of years of schooling
individuals would complete if zero new schools were constructed in their district, the first stage
coefficient identifies a weighted sum of the effect of one new school on years of schooling in every
district, with many negative weights.9
Hence, it is only if the average effects of Zg,t on Yi,g,t and Di,g,t are constant across groups and
periods, or if the weights are uncorrelated to treatment effects as in Assumption 7, that the
reduced-form and first-stage coefficients respectively identify the average effect of Zi,g,t on Yi,g,t
and Di,g,t. Then, this implies that β2SLSfe identifies, under the conditions in Imbens and Angrist
(1994), the LATE of Di,g,t on Yi,g,t among units that comply with the instrument.10
4 Extending the DIDM estimator
Theorem 3 can be extended to the case where Di,g,t is not binary but takes values in D =
{0, ..., d}. The causal effect we consider is the switchers’ causal response
δSCR = E
 1
ND,S
∑
(i,g,t):t≥2,Dg,t 6=Dg,t−1
[Yi,g,t (max(Dg,t, Dg,t−1))− Yi,g,t (min(Dg,t, Dg,t−1))]
 ,
where ND,S =
∑
(g,t):t≥2Ng,t|Dg,t −Dg,t−1|. Note that δSCR = δS when Di,g,t is binary.
We identify δSCR under the following two conditions, which generalize Assumptions 4-5 and 9-12
to non-binary treatments.
Assumption S5 (Mean independence between a group’s outcome and other groups treatments))
For all (d, g, t) ∈ D × {1, ..., G} × {1, ..., T}, E(Yg,t(d)|D) = E(Yg,t(d)|Dg).
Assumption S6 (Strong exogeneity) For all (d, g, t) ∈ D × {1, ..., G} × {2, ..., T}, E(Yg,t(d) −
Yg,t−1(d)|Dg) = E(Yg,t(d)− Yg,t−1(d)).
Assumption S7 (Common trends) For every d, for all t ≥ 2 and g, E(Yg,t(d)−Yg,t−1(d)) does
not vary across g.
9New schools were constructed in every district, so this application falls into the heterogeneous adoption case.
10In the special case with two groups and two periods, a binary incentive for treatment, and where only group 1
in period 1 receives the incentive, de Chaisemartin (2010) and Hudson et al. (2015) show that in a 2SLS regression
of Yi,g,t on 1{g = 2} , 1{t = 2} and Di,g,t, using Zg,t = 1{g = 2}1{t = 2} as the instrument, the coefficient
of Di,g,t identifies a LATE under common trends assumptions on Yi,g,t(Di,g,t(0)) and Di,g,t(0). However, the
discussion above shows that this result does not generalize to applications with multiple groups and periods or a
non-binary instrument, as in Duflo (2001) where the number of new schools constructed varies across districts.
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Assumption S8 (Existence of “stable” groups) For all t ∈ {2, ..., T}, for all (d, d′) ∈ D2, d 6= d′,
if there is at least one g ∈ {1, ..., G} such that Dg,t−1 = d and Dg,t = d′, then there exists at least
one g′ 6= g, g′ ∈ {1, ..., G} such that Dg′,t−1 = Dg′,t = d.
When the treatment takes a large number of values, Assumption S8 may be violated. A solution,
then, is to consider a modified treatment variable D˜g,t = h(Dg,t) that groups together several
values of Dg,t, to ensure that Assumption S8 holds for D˜g,t. For instance, if the treatment can
be equal to 0, 1, 2, or 3, and there is a group whose treatment switches from 2 to 3 between
periods 1 and 2, but no group whose treatment remains equal to 2 between those two dates, one
may define D˜g,t = min(Dg,t, 2) if there is a group whose treatment is equal to 3 at periods 1 and
2. Then, Theorem S5 below still holds, after replacing Dg,t by D˜g,t in the DIDd,d′,t estimators
defined below, and if Assumption S7 is replaced by the requirement that E(Yg,t(d) − Yg,t−1(d))
only depends on t and h(d).
In order to define DIDM in this context, let us introduce, for all (d, d′, t) ∈ D2 × {2, ..., T},
DIDd,d′,t = [1{d < d′} − 1{d′ < d}]
[ ∑
(g,t):Dg,t=d′,Dg,t−1=d,t≥2
Ng,t
Nd,d′,t
[Yg,t − Yg,t−1]
−
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=Dg,t−1=d,t≥2
Ng,t
Nd,d,t
[Yg,t − Yg,t−1]
]
,
where Nd,d′,t is defined as in (3) for any (d, d′) ∈ D2. Then
DIDM =
T∑
t=2
∑
(d,d′)∈D2,d 6=d′
Nd,d′,t
ND,S
DIDd,d′,t.
If the treatment is binary, the DIDM estimator defined above is equal to that defined in Section
4 of the paper.
Theorem S5 Suppose that Di,g,t ∈ D and Assumptions 1-2 and S5-S8 hold. Then E [DIDM] =
δSCR.
Theorem S5 generalizes Theorem 3 to non-binary treatments. We can also extend Theorem 4
in the same way to construct placebo tests of Assumption S7.
Finally, Theorem 3 can also be extended to the case with covariates. Under versions of As-
sumptions 10 and 11 written conditional on X, a conditional version of the DIDM estimator is
consistent for δS under the common support condition Supp(Xd,g,t) = Supp(X). We refer to
de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfœuille (2018) for further details.
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5 Statistical properties of DIDM and inference on δS
In this section, we establish the asymptotic properties of DIDM and construct confidence intervals
on δS based on DIDM. We consider an asymptotic framework where the number of groups G
tends to infinity. To define the confidence intervals, let Pd,d′,t = Nd,d′,t/G and
Qd,d′,t =
1
G
∑
g
Ng,t1{Dg,t = d,Dg,t−1 = d′} (Yg,t − Yg,t−1) .
Then, let σ̂2 =
∑
g ψ̂
2
g/G, with
ψ̂g =
G
NS
∑
t>1
Ng,t
[
1{Dg,t 6= Dg,t−1}(Yg,t − Yg,t−1 −DIDM)− ψ̂Bg,t
]
,
ψ̂Bg,t =
1
P0,0,t
[
1{Dg,t > Dg,t−1}Q0,0,t + P1,0,t1{Dg,t = Dg,t−1 = 0}
(
Yg,t − Yg,t−1 − Q0,0,t
P0,0,t
)]
+
1
P1,1,t
[
1{Dg,t < Dg,t−1}Q1,1,t + P0,1,t1{Dg,t = Dg,t−1 = 1}
(
Yg,t − Yg,t−1 − Q1,1,t
P1,1,t
)]
.
We consider confidence intervals of the form
CI1−α(δS) =
[
DIDM − z1−α/2 σ̂√
G
,DIDM + z1−α/2
σ̂√
G
]
,
where z1−α/2 denotes the quantile of order 1− α/2 of a standard normal variable.
We now establish the asymptotic properties of DIDM and CI1−α(δS) under the following assump-
tions. Hereafter, we denote U = (P0,0,1, Q0,0,1, ..., P1,1,T , Q1,1,T ).
Assumption S9 (Existence of moments and limits) supg,tNg,t < +∞ and sup(d,g,t)E(Y 4g,t(d)) <
+∞. limGE[U ] and limGG× V (U) exist.
Assumption S10 (Positive probability of “stable” groups and existence of switchers) For all
(d, g, t) ∈ {0, 1}×(N\{0})×{2, ..., T}, Pr(Dg,t = 1−d,Dg,t−1 = d) > 0 implies limGE[P1−d,d,t] >
0 and limGE[Pd,d,t] > 0. Moreover, limGE[P0,1,t + P1,0,t] > 0 for at least one t.
Assumption S9 imposes the (uniform) existence of moments of order 4 of Yg,t(d), and that
some non-random averages converge as G tends to infinity. These assumptions ensure that
we can apply law of large numbers and central limit theorems in our set-up where groups are
independent but not necessarily identically distributed. Assumption S10 imposes that when at
least one group switches from d to 1− d with a positive probability on a given period, then on
average over all groups, the limit probabilities of switching from d to 1 − d will be positive as
G→∞. The limit probability of remaining at d will also be positive. This latter condition may
be seen as a weaker version of Assumption 11, as it imposes the existence of “stable” groups only
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with probability tending to one as G→∞. The last condition in Assumption S10 simply states
that asymptotically, the proportion of switchers is strictly postive.
The following result shows that under these conditions, DIDM is asymptotically normal, and
that CI1−α(δS) is asymptotically conservative.
Theorem S6 Suppose that Assumptions 1-5, 9-10 and S9-S10 hold. Then, as G→∞,
√
G
(
DIDM − δS
) d−→ N (0, σ2),
with σ2 defined in (38) below. Moreover,
lim sup
G→∞
Pr
(
δS ∈ CI1−α(δS)
) ≥ 1− α.
Theorem S6 shows that DIDM is an asymptotically normal estimator of δS when the number of
groups tends to infinity, provided the outcomes and treatments are independent across groups.
As is usually the case for estimators constructed using independent but not identically distributed
random variables (see e.g. Liu and Singh, 1995), the asymptotic variance of DIDM can only be
conservatively estimated. As a result, the confidence interval we propose is asymptotically
conservative.
6 Detailed literature review
We now review the 33 papers that use two-way fixed effects or closely related regressions that
we found in our literature review. For each paper, we use the following presentation:
Authors (year), Title. Where the two-way fixed effects estimator is used in the paper.
Description of the two-way fixed effects estimator used in the paper, and how it relates to
Regression 1 or 2. Assessment of whether the stable groups assumption holds in this paper.
Assessment of whether the research design is sharp or fuzzy.
1. Chandra et al. (2010), Patient Cost-Sharing and Hospitalization Offsets in the
Elderly. First line of Tables 2 and 3.
In the regressions in the first line of Tables 2 and 3, the outcomes (e.g. a measure of
utilization for plan p in month t) are regressed on plan fixed effects, month fixed effects,
and an indicator of whether plan p had increased copayments in month t (see regression
equation at the bottom of page 198). This regression corresponds to Regression 1. The
period analyzed runs from January 2000 to September 2003. The stable groups assumption
is satisfied until January 2002, when the HMO plans also become treated. This is a sharp
design.
13
2. Duggan and Morton (2010), The Effect of Medicare Part D on Pharmaceutical
Prices and Utilization. Tables 2 and 3.
In regression Equation (1), the dependent variable is the change in the price of drug j
between 2003 and 2006, the explanatory variables are the Medicare market share for drug
j in 2003, and some control variables. This regression corresponds to Regression 2, with
some control variables. The stable groups assumption is presumably not satisfied: it seems
unlikely that there are drugs whose Medicare market share in 2003 is equal to 0. This is
a sharp design.
3. Aizer (2010), The Gender Wage Gap and Domestic Violence. Table 2.
In regression Equation (2), the dependent variable is the log of female assaults among
females of race r in county c and year t, and the explanatory variables are race, year,
county, race × year, race × county, and county × year fixed effects, as well as the gender
wage gap in county c, year t, and race r, and some control variables. This regression
is a “three-way fixed effects” version of Regression 1, with some control variables. The
stable groups assumption is presumably satisfied: it seems likely that between each pair
of consecutive years, there are counties where the gender wage gap does not change. This
is a fuzzy design: the treatment of interest is the gender wage gap in a couple (see the
bargaining model in Appendix 1), which varies within (year,county) cells.
4. Algan and Cahuc (2010), Inherited Trust and Growth. Figure 4.
Figure 4 presents a regression of changes in income per capita from 1935 to 2000 on changes
in inherited trust over the same period and a constant. This regression corresponds to
Regression 2. The stable groups assumption is satisfied: there are countries where inherited
trust does not change from 1935 to 2000. This is a sharp design.
5. Ellul et al. (2010), Inheritance Law and Investment in Family Firms. Table 7.
In the regressions presented in Table 7, the dependent variable is the capital expenditure
of firm j in year t, and the explanatory variables are firm fixed effects, an indicator for
whether year t is a succession period for firm j, some controls, and three treatment variables:
the interaction of the succession indicator with the level of investor protection in the
country where firm j is located, the interaction of the succession indicator with the level of
inheritance laws permissiveness in the country where firm j is located, and the interaction
of the succession indicator with the level of inheritance laws permissiveness and the level
of investor protection in the country where firm j is located. This regression is similar
to Regression 1 with controls, except that it has three treatment variables. The stable
groups assumption is presumably not satisfied: for instance, it seems unlikely that there
are countries with no investor protection at all. This is a sharp design.
6. Bustos (2011), Trade Liberalization, Exports, and Technology Upgrading: Ev-
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idence on the Impact of MERCOSUR on Argentinean Firms. Tables 3 to 12.
In regression Equation (11), the dependent variable is the change in exporting status of
firm i in sector j between 1992 and 1996, and the explanatory variables are the change
in trade tariffs in Brasil for products in sector j over the same period, and some control
variables. This regression corresponds to Regression 2, with some controls. The stable
groups assumption is presumably satisfied: it seems likely that there are sectors where
trade tariffs in Brasil did not change between 1992 and 1996. This is a sharp design.
7. Anderson and Sallee (2011), Using Loopholes to Reveal the Marginal Cost of
Regulation: The Case of Fuel-Economy Standards. Table 5 Column 2.
In the regression in Table 5 Column (2), the dependent variable is an indicator for whether
a car sold is a flexible fuel vehicle, and the explanatory variables are state and month fixed
effects, the percent of gas stations that have ethanol fuel in each month × state, and some
controls. This regression corresponds to Regression 1. The stable groups assumption is
presumably satisfied: it seems likely that between each pair of consecutive months, there
are states where the percent ethanol availability does not change. This a fuzzy design: the
treatment of interest is whether a car buyer has access to ethanol fuel, which varies within
(month,state) cells.
8. Bagwell and Staiger (2011), What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?
Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization. Table 3, OLS columns.
In regression equations (15a) and (15b), the dependent variable is the ad valorem tariff
level bound by country c on product g, while the explanatory variables are country and
product fixed effects, and two treatment variables which vary at the country × product
level. These regressions are similar to Regression 1, except that they have two treatment
variables. The stable groups assumption is not applicable here, as none of the two sets of
fixed effects included in the regression correspond to an ordered variable. This is a sharp
design.
9. Zhang and Zhu (2011), Group Size and Incentives to Contribute: A Natural
Experiment at Chinese Wikipedia. Tables 3 and 4, Columns 4-6.
In the regression in, say, Table 3 Column (4), the dependent variable is the total number
of contributions to Wikipedia by individual i at period t, regressed on individual fixed
effects, an indicator for whether period t is after the Wikipedia block, the interaction of
this indicator and a measure of social participation by individual i, and some controls. This
regression corresponds to Regression 1 with some controls. The stable groups assumption
is satisfied: there are individuals with a social participation measure equal to 0. This is a
sharp design.
10. Hotz and Xiao (2011), The Impact of Regulations on the Supply and Quality
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of Care in Child Care Markets. Table 7, Columns 4 and 5.
In Regression Equation (1), the dependent variable is the outcome for market m in state s
and year t, and the explanatory variables are state and year fixed effects, various measures
of regulations in state s in year t, and some controls. This regression corresponds to
Regression 1 with several treatment variables and with some controls. The stable groups
assumption is presumably satisfied: between each pair of consecutive years, it is likely that
there are states whose regulations do not change. This is a sharp design.
11. Mian and Sufi (2011), House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing, and the
US Household Leverage Crisis. Tables 2 and 3.
In Regression Equation (1), the dependent variable is the change in homeowner leverage
from 2002 to 2006 for individual i living in zip code z in MSA m, and the dependent
variable is the change in the house price for that individual, instrumented by MSA-level
housing supply elasticity. This regression is the 2SLS version of Regression 2, with some
controls. The stable groups assumption is presumably not satisfied: it is unlikely that
some MSAs have an housing supply elasticity equal to 0. This is a sharp design.
12. Wang (2011), State Misallocation and Housing Prices: Theory and Evidence
from China. Table 5, Panel A.
In regression Equation (15), the dependent variable is the quantity of housing services
in household i’s residence in year t, while the explanatory variables are an indicator for
period t being after the reform, a measure of mismatch in household i, the interaction of
the measure of mismatch and the time indicator, and some controls. This regression is
similar to Regression 1 with some controls, except that it has a measure of mismatch in
household i instead of household fixed effects. The stable groups assumption is presumably
satisfied: it is likely that some households have a mismatch equal to 0. This is a sharp
design.
13. Duranton and Turner (2011), The Fundamental Law of Road Congestion: Ev-
idence from US Cities. Table 5.
In the regressions presented in, say, the first column of Table 5, the dependent variable
is the change in vehicle kilometers traveled in MSA s between decades t and t-1, and the
explanatory variables are the change in kilometers of roads in MSA s between decades
t and t-1, and decade effects. This regression corresponds to Regression 2. The stable
groups assumption is presumably satisfied: it is likely that between each pair of consecu-
tive decades, there are some MSAs where the kilometers of roads do not change. This is a
sharp design.
14. Acemoglu et al. (2011), The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French
Revolution. Table 3.
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In regression Equation (1), the dependent variable is urbanization in polity j at time t,
while the explanatory variables are time and polity fixed effects, and the number of years
of French presence in polity j interacted with the time effects. This regression corresponds
to Regression 1. The stable groups assumption is satisfied as there are several polities that
did not experience any year of French presence. This is a sharp design.
15. Baum-Snow and Lutz (2011), School Desegregation, School Choice, and Changes
in Residential Location Patterns by Race. Tables 2 to 6.
In regression Equation (1), the dependent variable is, say, whites public school enrolment
in MSA j in year t, while the explanatory variables are MSA and region × time fixed ef-
fects, and an indicator for whether MSA j is desegregated. This regression corresponds to
Regression 1 with controls. The stable groups assumption is satisfied: between each pair
of consecutive years, there are MSAs whose desegregation status does not change. This is
a sharp design.
16. Dinkelman (2011), The Effects of Rural Electrification on Employment: New
Evidence from South Africa. Tables 4 and 5 Columns 5-8, Table 8 Columns 3-4, Table
9 Column 2, and Table 10 Columns 2, 4, and 6.
In regression Equation (3), the dependent variable is, say, the first difference of the female
employment rate for community j between periods 1 and 2, and the explanatory variables
are district fixed effects, the change of electrification status of community j between periods
1 and 2, and some statistical controls. The land gradient in community j is used as an
instrument for the change in electrification. This regression corresponds to the 2SLS version
of Regression 2 with some controls. The stable groups assumption is presumably satisfied:
it is likely that there are communities whose land gradient is 0. This is a sharp design.
17. Enikolopov et al. (2011), Media and Political Persuasion: Evidence from Rus-
sia. Table 3.
In regression Equation (5), the dependent variable is the share of votes for party j in
election-year t and subregion s, and the explanatory variables are subregion and election
fixed effects, and the share of people having access to NTV in subregion s in election-year t.
This regression corresponds to Regression 1. The stable groups assumption is not satisfied:
the share of people having access to NTV strictly increases in all regions between 1995 and
1999, the two elections used in the analysis. This a fuzzy design: the treatment of interest
is whether a person has access to NTV, which varies within (subregion,year) cells.
18. Fang and Gavazza (2011), Dynamic Inefficiencies in an Employment-Based
Health Insurance System: Theory and Evidence. Tables 2, 3, 5, and 6, Column 3.
In regression Equation (7), the dependent variable is the health expenditures of individual
j working in industry i in period t and region r, and the explanatory variables are individual
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effects, region specific time effects, and the job tenure of individual j. The death rate of
establishments in industry i in period t and region r is used as an instrument for the job
tenure of individual j. This regression is the 2SLS version of Regression 2 with controls. The
stable groups assumption is presumably satisfied: between each pair of consecutive years, it
is likely that there are some industry × region pairs where the death rate of establishments
does not change. This a fuzzy design: the instrument of interest is whether a person’s
former employee closed down over the current year, which varies within (industry,year)
cells.
19. Gentzkow et al. (2011), The Effect of Newspaper Entry and Exit on Electoral
Politics. Tables 2 and 3.
In regression Equation (2), the dependent variable is the change in voter turnout in county c
between elections year t and t-1, and the explanatory variables are state × year effects, and
the change in the number of newspapers in county c between t and t-1. This regression
corresponds to Regression 2 with controls. The stable groups assumption is satisfied:
between each pair of consecutive years, there are some counties where the number of
newspapers does not change. This is a sharp design.
20. Bloom et al. (2012), Americans Do IT Better: US Multinationals and the
Productivity Miracle. Table 2, Columns 6-8.
In the regression in, say, Column 6 of Table 2, the dependent variable is the log of output
per worker in firm i in period t, while the explanatory variables are firms and time fixed
effects, the log of the amount of IT capital per employee ln(C/L), the interaction of ln(C/L)
and an indicator for whether the firm is owned by a US multinational, the interaction of
ln(C/L) and an indicator for whether the firm is owned by a non-US multinational, and
some controls. This regression is similar to Regression 1 with some controls, except that
it has three treatment variables. The stable groups assumption is presumably satisfied:
between each pair of consecutive years, it is likely that there are some firms where the
amount of IT capital per employee ln(C/L) does not change. This is a sharp design.
21. Simcoe (2012), Standard Setting Committees: Consensus Governance for Shared
Technology Platforms. Table 4, Columns 1-3.
In regression Equation (5), the dependent variable is a measure of time to consensus for
project i submitted to committee j, while the explanatory variables are an indicator for
projects submitted to the standards track, a measure of distributional conflict, the inter-
action of the standards track and distributional conflict, and some controls variables. This
regression is similar to Regression 1 with some controls, except that it has a measure of
distributional conflict instead of committee fixed effects. The stable groups assumption is
presumably not satisfied: it is unlikely that there is any committee where the measure of
18
distributional conflict is equal to 0. This is a sharp design.
22. Moser and Voena (2012), Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading
with the Enemy Act. Table 2.
In the regression equation in the beginning of Section III, the dependent variable is the
number of patents by US inventors in patent class c at period t, and the explanatory
variables are patent class and time fixed effects, the interaction of period t being after
the trading with the enemy act and the number of licensed patents in class c, and some
control variables. This regression corresponds to Regression 1 with some controls. The
stable groups assumption is satisfied: there are patent classes where no patent was licensed.
This is a sharp design.
23. Forman et al. (2012), The Internet and Local Wages: A Puzzle. Tables 2 and 4.
In regression Equation (1), the dependent variable is the difference between log wages in
2000 and 1995 in county i, and the explanatory variables are the proportion of businesses
using Internet in county i in 2000, and control variables. This regression corresponds
to Regression 2 with some controls. The stable groups assumption is satisfied: there are
counties with no Internet investment in 2000. This a fuzzy design: the treatment of interest
is whether a business uses Internet, which varies within (county,year) cells.
24. Besley and Mueller (2012), Estimating the Peace Dividend: The Impact of
Violence on House Prices in Northern Ireland. Table 1, Columns 3 and 5-7.
In regression Equation (1), the dependent variable is the price of houses in region r at time
t, while the explanatory variables are region and time fixed effects, and the number of
people killed because of the civil war in region r at time t-1. This regression corresponds
to Regression 1. The stable groups assumption is presumably satisfied: between each pair
of consecutive years, it is likely that there are some regions where the number of people
killed because of the civil war does not change. This is a sharp design.
25. Dafny et al. (2012), Paying a Premium on Your Premium? Consolidation in
the US Health Insurance Industry. Table 3.
In regression Equation (3), the dependent variable is the the concentration of the hospital
industry in market m and year t, and explanatory variables are time fixed effects, market
fixed effects, and the change in concentration in market m induced by a merger interacted
with an indicator for t being after the merger. This regression corresponds to Regression
1. The stable groups assumption is satisfied: there are many markets where the merger
did not change concentration. This is a sharp design.
26. Hornbeck (2012), The Enduring Impact of the American Dust Bowl: Short-
and Long-Run Adjustments to Environmental Catastrophe. Table 2. In regression
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Equation (1), the dependent variable is, say, the change in log land value in county c
between period t and 1930, and the explanatory variables are state × year fixed effects, the
share of county c in high erosion regions, the share of county c in medium erosion regions,
and some control variables. This regression is similar to Regression 1 with controls, except
that it has two treatment variables. The stable groups assumption is satisfied: many
counties have 0% of their land situated in medium or high erosion regions. This a fuzzy
design: the treatments of interest are whether a piece of land is in high or in medium
erosion regions, which varies within (county,year) cells.
27. Bajari et al. (2012), A Rational Expectations Approach to Hedonic Price Re-
gressions with Time-Varying Unobserved Product Attributes: The Price of
Pollution. Table 5.
In, say, the first regression equation in the bottom of page 1915, the dependent variable
is the change in the price of house j between sales 2 and 3, and the explanatory variables
are the change in various pollutants in the area around house j between sales 2 and 3,
and some controls. This regression is similar to Regression 2 with controls, except that it
has several treatment variables. The stable groups assumption is presumably satisfied: it
is likely that for each pair of consecutive sales, there are houses where the level of each
pollutant does not change. This is a sharp design.
28. Dahl and Lochner (2012), The Impact of Family Income on Child Achievement:
Evidence from the Earned Income Tax Credit. Table 3.
In regression Equation (4), the dependent variable is the change in test scores for child
i between years a and a-1, while the explanatory variables are the change in the EITC
income of her family and some controls, and the change in the expected EITC income
of her family based on her family income in year a-1 is used to instrument for the actual
change of her family’s EITC income. This regression is a 2SLS version of Regression 2 with
controls, except that it does not have years fixed effects. The stable groups assumption is
presumably satisfied: it is likely that for each pair of consecutive years, there are children
whose family’s expected EITC income does not change. This is a sharp design.
29. Imberman et al. (2012), Katrina’s Children: Evidence on the Structure of Peer
Effects from Hurricane Evacuees. Tables 3-6.
In regression Equation (1), the dependent variable is the test score of student i in school
j in grade g and year t, and the explanatory variables are school and grade × year fixed
effects, the fraction of Katrina evacuee students received by school j in grade g and year t,
and some controls. This regression is a three-way fixed effects version of Regression 1. The
stable groups assumption is satisfied: there are schools that did not receive any Katrina
evacuee. This a fuzzy design: the treatment of interest is the proportion of evacuees in
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one’s class, which varies within (school,grade,year) cells.
30. Chaney et al. (2012), The Collateral Channel: How Real Estate Shocks Affect
Corporate Investment. Table 5.
In regression Equation (1), the dependent variable is the value of investment in firm i and
year t divided by the lagged book value of properties, plants, and equipments (PPE), and
the explanatory variables are firm and time fixed effects and the market value of firm i
in year t divided by its lagged PPE, and some controls. This regression corresponds to
Regression 1, with some controls. The stable groups assumption is presumably satisfied:
it is likely that between each pair of consecutive years, there are firms whose market value
divided by their lagged PPE does not change. This is a sharp design.
31. Aaronson et al. (2012), The Spending and Debt Response to Minimum Wage
Hikes. Tables 1, 2, and 5.
In regression Equation (1), the outcome variable is, say, income of household i at period t,
and the explanatory variables are household and time fixed effects, and the minimum wage
in the state where household i lives in period t. This regression corresponds to Regression
1. The stable groups assumption is satisfied: between each pair of consecutive periods,
there are states where the minimum wage does not change. This is a sharp design.
32. Brambilla et al. (2012), Exports, Export Destinations, and Skills. Table 5.
In the regression in, say, the first column of Table 2, the dependent variable is a measure
of skills in the labor force employed by firm i in industry j at period t, and the explanatory
variables are firm and industry × period fixed effects, the ratio of exports to sales in firm
i at period t, and some controls. This regression corresponds to Regression 1, with some
controls. The stable groups assumption is presumably satisfied: it is likely that between
each pair of consecutive periods, there are firms whose ratio of exports to sales does not
change. This is a sharp design.
33. Faye and Niehaus (2012), Political Aid Cycles. Table 3, Columns 4 and 5, and
Tables 4 and 5.
In regression Equation (2), the dependent variable is the amount of donations received by
receiver r from donor d in year t, and the explanatory variables are donor × receiver fixed
effects, an indicator for whether there is an election in country r in year t, a measure of
alignment between the ruling political parties in countries r and d at t, and the interaction
of the election indicator and the measure of alignment. This regression corresponds to
Regression 1. The stable groups assumption is presumably not satisfied: it is unlikely that
there are donor-receiver pairs that are perfectly unaligned. This is a sharp design.
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7 Proofs
Theorem S1 relies on the following lemma.
Lemma S1 If Assumptions 1 and 3-5 hold, for all (g, g′, t, t′) ∈ {1, ..., G}2 × {1, ..., T}2,
E(Yg,t|D)− E(Yg,t′ |D)− (E(Yg′,t|D)− E(Yg′,t′|D))
=Dg,tE
(
∆TRg,t
∣∣D)−Dg,t′E (∆TRg,t′∣∣D)− (Dg′,tE (∆TRg′,t∣∣D)−Dg′,t′E (∆TRg′,t′∣∣D)) .
Proof of Lemma S1
For all (g, t) ∈ {1, ..., G} × {1, ..., T},
E(Yg,t|D) =E
(
1
Ng,t
Ng,t∑
i=1
(Yi,g,t(0) +Di,g,t(Yi,g,t(1)− Yi,g,t(0)))
∣∣∣∣∣D
)
=E (Yg,t(0)|D) +Dg,tE
(
∆TRg,t
∣∣D) .
The end of the proof is the same as that of Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem S1
The proof of that result is very similar to the proof of Theorem 1.
βfe = E
(∑
g,tNg,tεg,tYg,t∑
g,tNg,tεg,tDg,t
)
= E
(∑
g,tNg,tεg,tE(Yg,t|D)∑
g,tNg,tεg,tDg,t
)
= E
(∑
g,tNg,tεg,t (E(Yg,t|D)− E(Yg,1|D)− E(Y1,t|D) + E(Y1,1|D))∑
g,tNg,tεg,tDg,t
)
= E
(∑
g,tNg,tεg,t
(
Dg,tE
(
∆TRg,t
∣∣D)−Dg,1E (∆TRg,1 ∣∣D)−D1,tE (∆TR1,t ∣∣D)+D1,1E (∆TR1,1 ∣∣D))∑
g,tNg,tεg,tDg,t
)
= E
(∑
g,tNg,tεg,tDg,tE
(
∆TRg,t
∣∣D)∑
g,tNg,tεg,tDg,t
)
= E
(∑
g,tNg,tεg,tDg,t∆
TR
g,t∑
g,tNg,tεg,tDg,t
)
.
The second equality follows from the law of iterated expectations. The third and fifth equalities
follow from Equations (5) and (6). The fourth equality follows from Lemma S1. The last equality
follows from the law of iterated expectations.
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Proof of Proposition S1
Assuming that Ng,2/Ng,1 does not vary across g ensures that there exists a strictly positive real
number φ such that Ng,2/Ng,1 = φ. Then,
εg,2 =Dg,2 −Dg,. −D.,2 +D.,.
=Dg,2 −
(
Ng,1
Ng,.
Dg,1 +
Ng,2
Ng,.
Dg,2
)
−D.,2 +
(
N.,1
N
D.,1 +
N.,2
N
D.,2
)
=Dg,2 −
(
1
1 + φ
Dg,1 +
φ
1 + φ
Dg,2
)
−D.,2 +
(
1
1 + φ
D.,1 +
φ
1 + φ
D.,2
)
=
1
1 + φ
(Dg,2 −Dg,1 −D.,2 +D.,1) , (25)
where the first and third equalities follow from the fact Ng,2/Ng,1 does not vary across g.
Then, the definition of wTRg,2 , Equation (25) and Assumption 1 imply that
wTRg,2 =
(Dg,2 −D.,2)∑G
g=1
Ng,2
N1
(Dg,2 −D.,2)Dg,2
=
(Dg,2 −D.,2)∑G
g=1
Ng,2
N1
(Dg,2 −D.,2)2
.
Proof of Theorem S2
The proof relies on the lemma below, which we start by proving, before proving the theorem.
Lemma S2 If Assumptions 1-5 and S2 hold,
E (Yg,t|D)− E (Yg,t−1|D)− (E (Yg′,t|D)− E (Yg′,t−1|D))
=(Dg,t −Dg,t−1)E (∆g,t|D)− (Dg′,t −Dg′,t−1)E (∆g′,t|D) .
Proof of Lemma S2
By Lemma 1 and Assumption S2,
E (Yg,t|D)− E (Yg,t−1|D)− (E (Yg′,t|D)− E (Yg′,t−1|D))
=Dg,tE (∆g,t|D)−Dg,t−1E (∆g,t−1|D)−Dg′,tE (∆g′,t|D) +Dg′,t−1E (∆g′,t−1|D)
=(Dg,t −Dg,t−1)E (∆g,t|D)− (Dg′,t −Dg′,t−1)E (∆g′,t|D) .
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Proof of the decomposition for the fixed-effect regression
First, we have∑
g,t
Ng,tεg,tE (Yg,t|D)
=
∑
g,t
Ng,tεg,t[E (Yg,t|D)− E (Y1,t|D)]
=
∑
g
T∑
t=2
[∑
t′≥t
Ng,t′εg,t′
]
[E (Yg,t|D)− E (Yg,t−1|D)− (E (Y1,t|D)− E (Y1,t−1|D))]
=
∑
g
T∑
t=2
[∑
t′≥t
Ng,t′εg,t′
]
[(Dg,t −Dg,t−1)E (∆g,t|D)− (D1,t −D1,t−1)E (∆1,t|D)]
=
∑
(g,t):Dg,t 6=Dg,t−1,t≥2
[
Ng,t(Dg,t −Dg,t−1)
∑
t′≥t
Ng,t′
Ng,t
εg,t′
]
E (∆g,t|D) . (26)
The first equality follows by (6). The second equality follows from summation by part and (6).
The third equality follows from Lemma S2. The fourth equality stems from the fact that by (6),
the terms with g = 1 vanish.
Similarly, ∑
g,t
Ng,tεg,tDg,t =
∑
g
T∑
t=2
[∑
t′≥t
Ng,t′εg,t′
]
[Dg,t −Dg,t−1]
=
∑
(g,t):Dg,t 6=Dg,t−1,t≥2
Ng,t(Dg,t −Dg,t−1)
∑
t′≥t
Ng,t′
Ng,t
εg,t′ . (27)
The result follows by combining (4), (26), (27), and the law of iterated expectations.
Proof of the decomposition for the first-difference regression
First, we have∑
(g,t):t≥2
Ng,tεfd,g,t (E (Yg,t|D)− E (Yg,t−1|D))
=
∑
(g,t):t≥2
Ng,tεfd,g,t (E (Yg,t|D)− E (Yg,t−1|D)− (E (Y1,t|D)− E (Y1,t−1|D)))
=
∑
(g,t):t≥2
Ng,tεfd,g,t [(Dg,t −Dg,t−1)E (∆g,t|D)− (D1,t −D1,t−1)E (∆1,t|D)]
=
∑
(g,t):t≥2
Ng,tεfd,g,t(Dg,t −Dg,t−1)E (∆g,t|D) .
The first equality follows from (14). The second equality follows from Lemma S2. The third
equality follows from (14) again. The result follows by combining (13) with the last display, and
using the law of iterated expectations.
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Proof that wSg,t ≥ 0 under Assumption 6 and if Ng,t/Ng,t−1 does not depend on g
Under Assumption 6, one has that Dg,t = 1{t ≥ ag}, with ag ∈ {1, ..., T + 1}. Therefore, given
the form of wSg,t, we just have to prove that for all g,∑
t≥ag
Ng,tεg,t ≥ 0. (28)
Because Ng,t/Ng,t−1 does not vary across g for all t ≥ 2, we have Ng,t = Ng,0γt for some γt ≥ 0.
Moreover, εg,t = Dg,t − Dg,. − D.,t + D.,.. Let γ˜t = γt/
∑
t≥0 γt, then Dg,. =
∑
t≥ag γ˜t, and
D.,. =
∑
t≥0 γ˜tD.,t. Hence,
1
Ng,0
∑
t γt
∑
t≥ag
Ng,tεg,t = Dg,. (1−Dg,. +D.,.)−
∑
t≥ag
γ˜tD.,t
= Dg,.
1−Dg,. + ∑
t<ag
γ˜tD.,t
−
∑
t≥ag
γ˜tD.,t
 (1−Dg,.). (29)
Now, because D.,t ≤ 1, ∑
t≥ag
γ˜tD.,t ≤
∑
t≥ag
γ˜t = Dg,..
Hence, in view of (29),
1
Ng,0
∑
t γt
∑
t≥ag
Ng,tεg,t ≥ Dg,.
∑
t<ag
γ˜tD.,t ≥ 0.
Therefore, (28) and the result follows.
Proof that wSfd,g,t ≥ 0
We just have to focus on the cases where Dg,t 6= Dg,t−1. Note that εfd,g,t = Dg,t − Dg,t−1 −
(D.,t − D.,t−1). Then, if Dg,t − Dg,t−1 = 1, the numerator of wSfd,g,t has the same sign as
1− (D.,t−D.,t−1), which is positive. If Dg,t−Dg,t−1 = −1, the numerator of wSfd,g,t has the same
sign as 1 + (D.,t −D.,t−1), which is also positive. Because the denominator sums terms that are
always positive, it is positive as well. The result follows.
Proof of Theorem S3
The reasoning is exactly the same as in Theorem 1, except that we rely on Lemma S3 below,
instead of Lemma 1. We thus only prove Lemma S3.
Lemma S3 If Assumptions 1-5 hold and Di,g,t ∈ {0, , ..., d}.
E (Yg,t|D)− E (Yg,t′ |D)− (E (Yg′,t|D)− E (Yg′,t′|D))
=Dg,tE
(
∆ACRg,t
∣∣D)−Dg,t′E (∆ACRg,t′ ∣∣D)− (Dg′,tE (∆ACRg′,t ∣∣D)−Dg′,t′E (∆ACRg′,t′ ∣∣D)) .
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Proof of Lemma S3
Under Assumption 2, we have E (Yg,t|D) = E (Yg,t(0)|D)+E (Yg,t(Dg,t)− Yg,t(0)|D). The result
follows by decomposing similarly the three other terms E (Yg,t′ |D), E (Yg′,t|D), and E (Yg′,t′ |D),
using Assumptions 3-5, and finally using the definition of ∆ACRg,t .
Proof of Theorem S4
The proof relies on the following lemma, that resembles Lemma 1 and that we do not prove.
Lemma S4 If Assumptions 1, 2, and S3-S4 hold, for all (g, g′, t, t′) ∈ {1, ..., G}2 × {1, ..., T}2,
E
(
Yg,t −X ′g,tγ
∣∣X,D)− E (Yg,t′ −X ′g,t′γ∣∣X,D)
− (E (Yg′,t −X ′g′,tγ∣∣X,D)− E (Yg′,t′ −X ′g′,t′γ∣∣X,D))
=Dg,tE (∆g,t|X,D)−Dg,t′E (∆g,t′ |X,D)− (Dg′,tE (∆g′,t|X,D)−Dg′,t′E (∆g′,t′ |X,D)) .
It follows from the Frisch-Waugh theorem and the definition of εXg,t that
E
(
β̂fe
∣∣∣X,D) = ∑g,tNg,tεXg,tE (Yg,t|X,D)∑
g,tNg,tε
X
g,tDg,t
. (30)
Now, by definition of εXg,t again,
T∑
t=1
Ng,tε
X
g,t = 0 for all g ∈ {1, ..., G}, (31)
G∑
g=1
Ng,tε
X
g,t = 0 for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}, (32)∑
g,t
Ng,tε
X
g,tXg,t = 0. (33)
Then, ∑
g,t
Ng,tε
X
g,tE (Yg,t|X,D))
=
∑
g,t
Ng,tε
X
g,tE
(
Yg,t −X ′g,tλ
∣∣X,D))
=
∑
g,t
Ng,tε
X
g,t
(
E
(
Yg,t −X ′g,tλ
∣∣X,D)− E (Yg,1 −X ′g,1λ∣∣X,D)
−E (Y1,t −X ′1,tλ∣∣X,D)+ E (Y1,1 −X ′1,1λ∣∣X,D))
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The first equality follows from (33). The second follows from Equations (31) and (32). Hence,∑
g,t
Ng,tε
X
g,tE (Yg,t|X,D)) =
∑
g,t
Ng,tε
X
g,t (Dg,tE (∆g,t|X,D)−Dg,1E (∆g,1|X,D)
−D1,tE (∆1,t|X,D) +D1,1E (∆1,1|X,D))
=
∑
g,t
Ng,tε
X
g,tDg,tE (∆g,t|X,D)
=
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,tε
X
g,tE (∆g,t|X,D) . (34)
The first equality follows from Lemma 4. The second follows from Equations (31) and (32). The
third follows from Assumption 2. Finally, Assumption 2 implies that∑
g,t
Ng,tε
X
g,tDg,t =
∑
(g,t):Dg,t=1
Ng,tε
X
g,t. (35)
Combining (30), (34), (35), and the law of iterated expectations yields the result.
Proof of Theorem S5
Reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 3, we get that for all t ≥ 2,
Nd,d′,tE (DIDd,d′,t|D) =
∑
g:Dg,t=d′,Dg,t−1=d
Ng,tE (Yg,t(max(d, d
′))− Yg,t(min(d, d′))|D)
=
∑
(i,g):Dg,t=d′,Dg,t−1=d
E (Yi,g,t(max(Dg,t, Dg,t−1))− Yi,g,t(min(Dg,t, Dg,t−1))|D) .
For all (g, t), there exists one (d, d′) ∈ D2 such that Dg,t = d′ and Dg,t−1 = d. Hence,
T∑
t=2
∑
(d,d′)∈D2:d 6=d′
Nd,d′,tE (DIDd,d′,t|D)
=
T∑
t=2
∑
(d,d′)∈D2
Nd,d′,tE (DIDd,d′,t|D)
=
∑
(i,g,t):t≥2
E (Yi,g,t(max(Dg,t, Dg,t−1))− Yi,g,t(min(Dg,t, Dg,t−1))|D) .
The result follows by definition of DIDM and δSCR, and the law of iterated expectations.
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Proof of Theorem S6
1. Asymptotic normality
Let us define P S = NS/G and
T S =
1
G
∑
(g,t):t≥2
Ng,t1{Dg,t 6= Dg,t−1} [Yg,t(1)− Yg,t(0)] .
We prove the result in two steps. First, we prove that
√
G
(
DIDM − E(T S)/E(P S)
)
is asymp-
totically normal. Second, we show that the difference between E(T S)/E(P S) and δS is asymp-
totically negligible.
Convergence of
√
G
(
DIDM − E(T S)/E(P S)
)
By Assumption S9,
sup
g,t
N4g,tE[1{Dg,t = d,Dg,t−1 = d′} (Yg,t − Yg,t−1)4] < +∞.
Thus, Lyapunov’s condition for the central limit theorem holds, and because Σ = limg G×V (U)
exists, √
G (U − E[U ]) d−→ N (0,Σ) ,
By Assumption S9, P∞d,d′,t = limG→∞E(Pd,d′,t) exists. Then for d ∈ {0, 1}, define Td = {t :
P∞1−d,d,t > 0} and the event D = {NS > 0} ∩ D0 ∩ D1, with
Dd = {t ∈ Td ⇐⇒ min(Nd,d,t, N1−d,d,t) > 0} .
By the law of large numbers and Assumption S10, NS > 0 with probability approaching one.
Next, fix d ∈ {0, 1}. If t ∈ Td, then, by the law of large numbers, N1−d,d,t > 0 with probability
approaching one. Moreover, for such a t, there exists g such that Pr(Dg,t = 1−d,Dg,t−1 = d) > 0
and thus, by Assumption S10, P∞d,d,t > 0. Then, by the law of large numbers again, Nd,d,t > 0
with probability approaching one. Conversely, if min(Nd,d,t, N1−d,d,t) > 0, then there exists g
such that Pr(Dg,t = 1− d,Dg,t−1 = d) > 0. Hence, by Assumption S10 again, P∞1−d,d,t > 0. This
shows that Dd, and thus D, holds with probability approaching one.
Now, by definition of DIDM, under D we have DIDM = f(U), with
f (p0,0,1, q0,0,1, ..., p1,1,T , q1,1,T ) =
∑1
d=0(−1)d
∑
t∈Td q1−d,d,t − (p1−d,d,t/pd,d,t)qd,d,t∑T
t=1 p1,0,t + p0,1,t
, (36)
for all (pd,d′,t)(d,d′,t) such that all denominators are strictly positive. By Assumption S9 again,
E[U ] converges to U∞. Furthermore, f is continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of U∞.
Thus, by the uniform delta method (see, e.g. van der Vaart, 2000, Theorem 3.8),
√
G (DIDM − f(E[U ])) = Jf (U∞)×
√
G (U − E[U ]) + oP (1). (37)
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Finally, f(E(U)) = fN/fD, with
fN =
1
G
1∑
d=0
(−1)d
∑
t∈Td
∑
g
Ng,t
[
E (1{Dg,t = 1− d,Dg,t−1 = d}(Yg,t − Yg,t−1))
−E(P1−d,d,t)
E(Pd,d,t)
E (1{Dg,t = Dg,t−1 = d}(Yg,t − Yg,t−1))
]
fD =
∑
t≥2
E[P1,0,t + P0,1,t].
Reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 3 (see in particular Equations (20)-(21)) and noting that
if t 6∈ Td, then, by Assumption S10 Pr(Dg,t = 1 − d,Dg,t−1 = d) = 0, we get fN = E(T S).
Moreover, fD = E(P S). Hence,
√
G
(
DIDM − E(T
S)
E(P S)
)
d−→ N (0, σ2) , with σ2 = Jf (U∞)ΣJf (U∞)′. (38)
Convergence to 0 of
√
G
(
E(T S)/E(P S)− δS)
Let us define DG = (Dg,t)(g,t):g≤G,t=1...T , T˜ = E[T S|DG] and I = 1{|P S − E(P S)| < εG},
where εG > 0 will be specified below. By Assumption S10, limG→∞E(P S) > 0. Thus, it suffices
to prove that
√
G
(
E(P S)δS − E(T S))→ 0 . Because δS = E[T S/P S], we have
E(P S)δS − E(T S) =E
[
T˜ (E(P S)− P S)/P S
]
=E
[
T˜ I(E(P S)− P S)/P S
]
+ E
[
T˜ (1− I)(E(P S)− P S)/P S
]
. (39)
First, consider the second term on the right-hand side. By applying twice the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality, we get
√
G|E[T˜ (1− I)(E(P S)− P S)/P S]| ≤
√
GV (P S)1/2
[
E[(T˜ /P S)4] Pr(I = 0)
]1/4
By Assumption S9,
√
GV (P S)1/2 converges towards a finite limit. Thus, it suffices to show that
the term into brackets tends to 0. To this end, note first that
E[T S|DG] = 1
G
∑
(g,t):t≥2
Ng,t1{Dg,t 6= Dg,t−1}E[Yg,t(1)− Yg,t(0)|DG].
Now, let Ag,t = Ng,t1{Dg,t 6= Dg,t−1} and Bg,t = E[Yg,t(1)−Yg,t(0)|DG]. By Assumption S9 and
Jensen’s inequality, sup(g,G,t):g≤GE[|Bg,t|4] < +∞. Then(
T˜
P S
)4
≤
(∑
g,tAg,t|Bg,t|∑
g,tAg,t
)4
≤
(
max
g,t
|Bg,t|4
)
≤
∑
g,t
|Bg,t|4.
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Hence, E[(T˜ /P S)4] Pr(I = 0) ≤ K1GPr(I = 0) for some constant K1 > 0. Moreover, by
Hoeffding’s inequality,
Pr(I = 0) ≤ 2 exp
(
−2G2ε2G∑
gN
2
g,.
)
.
By Assumption S9, there exists c > 0 such that for all G, 1/G
∑G
g=1N
2
g,. < 2c. Then,
−2G2ε2G∑
gN
2
g,.
≤ −Gε
2
G
c
.
Let εG = (C ln(G)/G)1/2, for some C > c. Then, by what precedes, GPr(I = 0) → 0 and the
second term of the right-hand side of (39) tends to zero.
Now, let us move to the first term of the right-hand side of (39). We have
|E[T˜ I(E(P S)− P S)/P S]|
=
∣∣∣E[I(T˜ − E(T˜ ))(E(P S)− P S)/P S] + E(T˜ ) (E(P S)E(I/P S)− E(I))∣∣∣
≤E(P S)V (T˜ )1/2
(
E[I
(
1/P S − 1/E(P S))2])1/2
+ |E(T˜ )|E(P S)|E(I/P S)− E(I)/E(P S)|. (40)
We now prove that both terms on the right-hand side tend to zero. First, by Taylor expansions
of x 7→ 1/x around E(P S), there exist (P S1 , P S2 ) in the interval between P S and E(P S) such that
1
P S
=
1
E(P S)
− P
S − E(P S)
P S21
, (41)
1
P S
=
1
E(P S)
− P
S − E(P S)
E(P S)2
+
(P S − E(P S))2
P S32
. (42)
When I = 1, |P S1 −E(P S)| < εG and |P S2 −E(P S)| < εG. Recall also that limGE(P S) > 0 and
εG → 0. Then, in view of (41) and by Assumption S9,
E[I
(
1/P S − 1/E(P S))2] ≤ V (P S)
(E(P S)− εG)4 → 0.
Moreover, by definition of T˜ , GV (T˜ ) ≤ GV (T S), and the latter is bounded by Assumption S9.
Therefore, the first term of the right-hand side of (40) tends to 0.
Now, multiplying (42) by I and taking the expectation on both sides, we obtain:
√
G|E(I/P S)− E(I)/E(P S)| ≤
√
G
∣∣∣∣E[I(P S − E(P S))]E(P S)2
∣∣∣∣+
√
GV (P S)
(E(P S)− εG)3
≤
∣∣∣∣∣
[
GPr(I = 0)V (P S)
]1/2
E(P S)2
∣∣∣∣∣+
√
GV (P S)
(E(P S)− εG)3
→ 0.
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2. Validity of the confidence intervals
There exists σ2G such that
∑
g ψ̂
2
g/G− σ2G P−→ 0, with lim infG σ2G ≥ σ2.
Let Q∞d,d′,t = limG→∞E[Qd,d′,t] and λg be the column vector such that U =
∑G
g=1 λg/G. Some
tedious algebra show that Jf (U∞)× λg = ψg, with
ψg =
1
P∞S
∑
t>1
Ng,t
[
1{Dg,t 6= Dg,t−1}(Yg,t − Yg,t−1 − f(U∞))− ψBg,t
]
and
ψBg,t =
1
P∞0,0,t
[
1{Dg,t > Dg,t−1}Q∞0,0,t + P∞1,0,t1{Dg,t = Dg,t−1 = 0}
(
Yg,t − Yg,t−1 −
Q∞0,0,t
P∞0,0,t
)]
+
1
P∞1,1,t
[
1{Dg,t < Dg,t−1}Q∞1,1,t + P∞0,1,t1{Dg,t = Dg,t−1 = 1}
(
Yg,t − Yg,t−1 −
Q∞1,1,t
P∞1,1,t
)]
.
Hence, in view of (37)-(38), σ2 = limG
∑
g V (ψg)/G. Next, we show that
∑
g ψ̂
2
g/G is asymptoti-
cally larger than σ2. For that purpose, let σ2G =
∑
g E(ψ
2
g)/G and remark that ψ̂g = Jf (U)×λg.
Then
1
G
∑
g
ψ̂2g − σ2G =
1
G
∑
g
[
ψ̂2g − ψ2g
]
+
[
1
G
∑
g
ψ2g − σ2G
]
. (43)
Let λk,g denote the kth coordinate of λg. Assumption S9 ensures that
sup
k,g
E
[
λ4k,g
]
< +∞. (44)
Thus, we also have supg E(ψ2g) < +∞. Therefore, by the weak law of large numbers, the second
term on the right-hand side of (43) converges to 0. Next,
1
G
∑
g
[
ψ̂2g − ψ2g
]
= (Jf (U)− Jf (U∞))
[
1
G
∑
g
λgλ
′
g
]
(Jf (U) + Jf (U
∞))′ . (45)
By (44) again and the weak law of large numbers, U P−→ U∞. Moreover, f is continuously differ-
entiable in a vicinity of U∞, Thus, by the continuous mapping theorem, Jf (U)−Jf (U∞) P−→ 0.
By (44) once again and the weak law of large numbers,
1
G
∑
g
(
λgλ
′
g − E[λgλ′g]
) P−→ 0.
Moreover, by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and (44), we have, for all k, `,∣∣∣∣∣ 1G∑
g
E[λk,gλ`,g]
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ supk,`,gE[|λk,gλ`,g|] ≤ supk,`,gE [|λk,g|2] < +∞.
As a result,
∑
g λgλ
′
g/G = OP (1). Finally, because Jf (U) converges in probability, Jf (U) +
Jf (U
∞) = OP (1). Thus, in view of (45), the first term on the right-hand side of (43) converges
in probability to 0. Hence, we have proven that
∑
g ψ̂
2
g/G− σ2G P−→ 0. Finally, E(ψ2g) ≥ V (ψg)
and thus σ2G −
∑
g V (ψg)/G ≥ 0. Therefore, lim infG σ2G ≥ σ2.
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CI1−α(δS) is asymptotically conservative.
By (38), the convergence to 0 of
√
G
(
E(T S)/E(P S)− δS), (37), and since ψg = Jf (U∞)×λg,
√
G
DIDM − δS
σ̂
=
σ
σG
[
σG
σ̂
1√
G
∑
g ψg
σ
+ oP (1)
]
.
Let ZG denote the term into brackets. By the first step above and Slutsky’s lemma ZG
d−→
N (0, 1). Fix η > 0. Because lim infG σ2G ≥ σ2, there exists G0 such that for every G ≥ G0,
√
G
∣∣∣∣DIDM − δSσ̂
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (1 + η)|ZG|.
Then, letting Φ denote the cdf of the standard normal distribution, we get
lim sup
G
Pr
(
δS ∈ CI1−α
) ≥ Φ(z1−α/2
1 + η
)
− Φ
(
zα/2
1 + η
)
.
The result follows by letting η tend to zero.
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